Rethinking Bargaining Unit Determination: Labor Law and the Structure of Collective Representation in a Changing Workplace by Colvin, Alexander
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
Spring 1998 
Rethinking Bargaining Unit Determination: Labor Law and the 
Structure of Collective Representation in a Changing Workplace 
Alexander Colvin 
Cornell University, ajc22@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Labor History Commons, and the Unions 
Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Rethinking Bargaining Unit Determination: Labor Law and the Structure of 
Collective Representation in a Changing Workplace 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Arguably the leading issue for current labor law research is whether the existing system of law 
based on the Wagner Act model can continue to be relevant and appropriate for the contemporary 
workplace. Changes in the environment of work during the over half-century since this model was 
developed have brought pressures for re-evaluation and adaptation of key elements of its structure. 
Criticism of this system has focused on a number of areas, including: the reliance on the formal grievance 
procedure and arbitration; the separation of the realms of collective bargaining and business decision 
making; the limitations on employee participation in the workplace; and various weaknesses in the 
protection of the right to organize. Broad questions have been raised as to whether this system of law can 
provide reasonable worker access to collective representation, respond to the needs of those who do 
manage to invoke its protection, or provide an appropriate structure for management of employment in 
modem organizations. If not, perhaps it should be replaced by some entirely different legal structure. 
However, given the political and institutional impediments and unlikelihood of an imminent wholesale 
change in the system of labor law, the pressing question remains: to what degree can the current system 
be adapted and made relevant for the contemporary workplace? 
Keywords 
Wagner Act, dispute resolution, worker rights, arbitration, labor law, union organizing 
Disciplines 
Labor and Employment Law | Labor History | Labor Relations | Unions 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Colvin, A. J. S. (1998). Rethinking bargaining unit determination: Labor law and the structure of collective 
representation in a changing workplace [Electronic version]. Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, 
15(2), 419-490. 
Required Publisher Statement 
© Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/574 
RETHINKING BARGAINING UNIT
DETERMINATION: LABOR LAW AND
THE STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE
REPRESENTATION IN A
CHANGING WORKPLACE
Alexander Colvin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Arguably the leading issue for current labor law research is
whether the existing system of law based on the Wagner Act model'
can continue to be relevant and appropriate for the contemporary
workplace. Changes in the environment of work during the over
half-century since this model was developed have brought pressures
for re-evaluation and adaptation of key elements of its structure.
Criticism of this system has focused on a number of areas, includ-
ing: the reliance on the formal grievance procedure and arbitration;
the separation of the realms of collective bargaining and business
* LL.B., M.I.R. (Toronto), Ph.D. Candidate, New York State School of Industrial &
Labor Relations, Cornell University. The author would like to thank Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Harry C. Katz, Patrick Macklem, and participants in the Cornell University Collective
Bargaining Department Workshop for valuable comments and suggestions, and the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support. This work is a
development from and expansion of a paper that was presented at the Bargaining Group
Conference at the University of Minnesota in October, 1996.
1. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). In the United
States, the current National Labor Relations Act, is the direct descendent of the initial
Wagner Act. In Canada, the federal and ten provincial labor law jurisdictions have based
their systems on the Wagner Act. In analyzing the "Wagner Act model" of labor law,
references and discussion in this paper will include both the American and Canadian variants
of this model. While important variations exist between these labor law systems, the analysis
developed here is based on the idea that in the area of bargaining unit determination they
share a common underlying structure. As a result, examples and arguments are based on
both Canadian and National Labor Relations Act variants of the Wagner Act model with the
intention that the analysis, implications, and recommendations are generally applicable to
them both.
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decision making; the limitations on employee participation in the
workplace; and various weaknesses in the protection of the right to
organize.2 Broad questions have been raised as to whether this sys-
tem of law can provide reasonable worker access to collective rep-
resentation, respond to the needs of those who do manage to
invoke its protection, or provide an appropriate structure for man-
agement of employment in modem organizations. If not, perhaps it
should be replaced by some entirely different legal structure.3
However, given the political and institutional impediments and
unlikelihood of an imminent wholesale change in the system of
labor law, the pressing question remains: to what degree can the
current system be adapted and made relevant for the contemporary
workplace?
One area that has received relatively little attention in the re-
evaluations of the Wagner Act model of labor law is the process of
bargaining unit determination. This is a significant weakness in the
current literature given the centrality of the bargaining unit to the
Wagner Act model as the fundamental collective unit for worker
representation. The process of bargaining unit determination espe-
cially warrants more detailed analysis given its relevance to a
number of the key workplace changes that are occurring. The goal
of this article is to analyze the structure of the current process of
bargaining unit determination and to consider to what degree it
should be modified to respond to the changing industrial relations
environment.
The Wagner Act model was developed at the time of the great
union organizing drives in the large plants of the automobile, steel,
and other manufacturing industries.4 That world differs sharply
from today's expanded service sector with its organizational struc-
ture which often includes many small branches and retail outlets.
The financial context of the workplace has also changed with com-
panies becoming increasingly flexible in moving capital investments
between different plants or business divisions with major conse-
2. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: Tim FuTuRE OF LABOR
& EMPLOYmENT LAW (1990); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in
American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
3. See generally Symposium on the Legal Future of Employee Representation, 69 CI.-
KENT L. REv. 49 (1993) (presenting a range of different perspectives and critiques of the
Wagner Act model).
4. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 265-66 (1978).
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quences for their workforces. In addition, new forms of organiza-
tion of production have altered the relationship between different
units in the production process. Whereas industrial plants could
once have been conceptualized as independent units utilizing and
producing generic goods such as the archetypal "widget," contem-
porary organizations are increasingly tightly linked into and depen-
dent upon their position in relation to other suppliers and
customers. Each of these changes has significant consequences for
the structure of the collective organization of employment rela-
tions. Assumptions about the nature of bargaining unit structure
underlying the Wagner Act model, that were developed in its early
years, need to be re-examined in light of these changes.
When bargaining unit structure is discussed, it is primarily in
terms of centralized versus decentralized bargaining structures. For
instance, an important recent development in industrial relations is
the decentralization of bargaining that has occurred in a number of
countries. 5 At a more local level, a common tension reflected in
bargaining unit determination decisions is between factors favoring
more centralized versus more decentralized units.6 While the ques-
tion of centralization versus decentralization is an important issue
in unit structure, other deeper tensions exist in the process of bar-
gaining unit determination due to the nature of the Wagner Act
model of labor law.
Under this model there exists a dual role of the bargaining unit,
as both the electoral district for union certification and the negotiat-
ing unit to which bargaining rights and obligations attach, creating a
fundamental tension.7 The consequences of the relationship
between these dual roles of the bargaining unit are central to how
labor law, under the Wagner Act model, responds to the changes
that are occurring in the workplace. To date, the predominant con-
ceptualization of this relationship in labor law has been to unify
these two roles in a common unit that is static over time. However,
examples also exist of exceptions to this approach to the relation-
ship between the two roles of the bargaining unit.8 These excep-
5. See Harry C. Katz, The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: A Literature
Review and Comparative Analysis, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. RFv. 3 (1993).
6. See id. at 4.
7. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product
Markets, 69 Cm.-KETrr L. REv. 3, 11 (1993).
8. See, e.g., Katz supra, note 5.
1998]
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tions reflect an alternative model of the relationship, which
recognizes the separate considerations in the two roles of the bar-
gaining unit and allows for a dynamic process in which the unit may
be altered to reflect changed circumstances. The choice between a
unified-static model and a separated-dynamic model of bargaining
unit determination has important implications both for access to
and the conduct of collective bargaining.
I. STRAINS FROM A CHANGED INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS ENVIRONMENT
A. Bargaining Unit Structure in the Post-War Industrial Relations
System and its Breakdown
To understand the pressures for change in the process of bargain-
ing unit determination, it is first necessary to examine how this pro-
cess functioned during the period of stability in the industrial
relations system following the Second World War. The inability to
sustain that role for the process of bargaining unit determination
and transfer it to other contexts in the contemporary workplace is
an important element in how the system of labor law has contrib-
uted to the failure of the post-war system of industrial relations to
provide a more broadly applicable and successful structure for
employment relations.
The key to the success of the bargaining unit determination pro-
cess in the post-war industrial relations system was the ability to
combine a legal structure based on certification of plant level bar-
gaining units with a voluntary structure that connected bargaining
at broader national and multi-employer levels.9 Indeed, the success
of this super-structure of broader level bargaining may have con-
tributed to obscuring the significance of the underlying system of
bargaining unit determination in labor law during that period.
Industrial relations researchers of the period could describe the
national union as being the dominant institution for collective bar-
gaining and how labor market structures had expanded in tandem
with product markets to the corresponding national level.10 The
paradox is that despite the development of bargaining at a national
9. See Estreicher, supra note 7, at 10-11. (noting the characteristic combination of
decentralized plant level units and the limitation of broader multi-employer units only being
created as voluntary arrangements).
10. See, e.g., LLOYD ULmAN, TiiE RISE OF THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION (1955).
[Vol. 15:419
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level between employers and national industrial unions, the system
of labor law was still able to be grounded on a structure of plant
level legal bargaining units. To anticipate the argument that will be
presented, with the breakdown and transformation of the post-war
system of industrial relations, the loss of the ability to overcome this
paradox has become a major impediment to the continued viability
of the Wagner Act model of labor law.
The operation of the bargaining unit system in the post-war
period can be seen through its paradigmatic example - the system of
industrial relations that developed in the automobile industry. A
leading contemporary study of this system described it as involving
three key features: wage rules; connective bargaining; and job con-
trol unionism.1 It is the second feature of this system, connective
bargaining, that underlies the viability of a structure of plant level
legal bargaining units combined with national level bargaining.
The system of connective bargaining combined the series of col-
lective bargaining relationships between individual plants and the
local unions at the level where the legal bargaining units existed,
into a stable national level bargaining structure.' 2 Collective bar-
gaining in the automobile industry is centered on negotiating
rounds at the national level between the United Auto Workers
("UAW") and each of the major automobile manufacturers.' 3
However, as in other industries, certification of legal bargaining
units in the automobile industry occurs on a plant level basis.' 4
Thus, a company like General Motors, that had negotiated with the
UAW as the representative of its workers at a national level for
over three decades, could attempt to pursue a strategy of develop-
ing non-union plants in the southern United States.' 5 The UAW
clearly represented a majority of workers within the national level
unit of all General Motors' production employees, that in reality
was the bargaining structure. In labor law, the bargaining units and
hence the units within which representational status was deter-
mined, continued to be the individual plants.
11. See HARRY C. KAxz, StuFfiNG GEARS: CHANGING LABOR RELATIONS IN THE U.S.
AuToMoBnLE INDusTRY 6 (1985)[hereinafter SmrING GEARS].
12. See id. at 29-30.
13. See id. at 1.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 35.
1998]
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Under connective bargaining, pay and fringe benefits were nego-
tiated in national level collective agreements between the UAW and
the company. 16 These national agreements were then supple-
mented by plant level agreements negotiated by local unions. 7 In
addition, the local unions administered at the individual plants,
both the national level and the supplemental plant agreements."i
To make this system function, the UAW and management needed
to exert significant control over the plant level agreements and con-
tract administration to ensure that they did not introduce such a
degree of variation in work rules or job classifications as to under-
mine the wage provisions of the national level agreements. 19 As a
result, it was important to the maintenance of the national structure
of bargaining that standardization between plants be in the interest
of both the union and management.2 °
In Shifting Gears, Katz notes both the economic and political
functions of connective bargaining that provided this motivation.2 '
An initial union economic motivation for standardization was to
prevent the union's wage position from being undercut by manage-
ment negotiating agreements with local unions in southern automo-
bile plants where, the union's bargaining power was weaker. 2 The
union could afford to take a strong line against this type of intra-
company divergence due to the general expansion of the automo-
bile industry during the 1950's and 1960's, which reduced the dan-
ger of resulting job losses.23 At this time, competition from foreign
imports was limited, further reducing the threat of employment
reductions.24
Politically, standardization of wages at the national level satisfied
workers' equity concerns for comparability of wages, thereby pro-
viding support for the national leadership of the union and their
bargaining activities.' In turn, this provided management with
protection from the demands of more radical local union leaders
16. See SHTIN'nG GEARS, supra note 11, at 22-24.
17. See SHWITG GEARS, supra note 11, at 22-23.
18. See SHIFTING GEARS, supra note 11, at 23-24.
19. See SHITING GEARS, supra note 11, at 36.
20. See SHIwrnG GEARS, supra note 11, at 38.
21. See SHwING GEARS, supra note 11, at 34-38.
22. See SHIrlNo GEARS, supra note 11, at 35.
23. See SHITING GEARS, supra note 11, at 37-38.
24. See SHInNG GEARS, supra note 11, at 36.
25. See SHIw-rIN GEARS, supra note 11, at 36.
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who might exert pressure at plants where the union's bargaining
power was stronger.a6 Given a stable, expanding national product
market for the automobile industry, the maintenance of a national
structure of bargaining provided management with the advantage
of predictable, stable labor market outcomes at a corresponding
national level.27 Thus, the congruence between national product
and labor markets supported the voluntary acceptance by manage-
ment and the union of a national level bargaining structure, despite
the underlying legal structure of plant level bargaining units.28
Extensions of the voluntary, single employer, national level bar-
gaining structures to produce common labor market outcomes
between different employers were provided in the post-war indus-
trial relations system through the practice of pattern bargaining.2 9
In the rubber, trucking, and steel industries, this was demonstrated
by the creation of more formal multi-employer bargaining struc-
tures.3 0 In the absence of significant threats to product markets
from foreign competition, the resulting wage standardization was
able to protect workers' wages from labor market competition and
provide labor cost stability without threatening competitiveness for
management.3 1 Again, the crucial aspect of these arrangements
was that they were voluntary practices accepted by management
and unions. While the Wagner Act model of labor law allowed
these practices to be developed, and to a partial degree, regulated
conduct within them, the legal process of bargaining unit determi-
nation was not modified to correspond to this actual structure of
the bargaining process.32 Thus, when voluntary support for broader
based bargaining subsequently eroded, the labor law system did not
provide institutional support for the maintenance of these
arrangements.
26. See SHIFTING GEARS, supra note 11, at 38.
27. See SmFrnIG GEARS, supra note 11, at 38.
28. See SHIFTING GEARS, supra note 11, at 38.
29. See SmIFrING GEARS, supra note 11, at 33-34.
30. See SHIFTI G GEARS, supra note 11, at 189-90. For more on the decline of industry
wide bargaining, see CHARLES R. PERRY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE DECLINE OF
THE UNITED MINE WORKERS (1984); COLLECTrIvE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (Gerald G. Somers ed. 1979); CHARLES R. PERRY, DEREGULATION
AND THE DECLINE OF THE UNIONIZED TRUCKING INDUSTRY (1986).
31. See SHIFINrNG GEARS, supra note 11, at 36.
32. See SHIFTrG GEARS, supra note 11, at 47.
1998]
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This erosion of voluntary support for broader based bargaining
occurred during the 1970's and 1980's with the convergence of a
number of factors. Increasing globalization meant that competition
in product markets could no longer be confined to the national
level where the labor market bargaining structures had devel-
oped.33 In conjunction with this shift in product markets, manage-
ment increasingly shifted production to nonunion plants to achieve
a competitive advantage through lower labor costs and the utiliza-
tion of new human resource management strategies.34 Lack of
effective legal protection or political support for collective bargain-
ing facilitated this strategy of shifting production to nonunion
plants. These changes have justifiably been described as key factors
producing a transformation of the industrial relations system.35
In addition to other effects on the industrial relations system,
these changes brought about an erosion of voluntary support for
broader based bargaining.36 With it no longer being possible to
control competition based on labor costs through standardization
across a labor market structure that corresponded to a national
level product market, the incentive increased for management to
try to shift bargaining to the plant level to seek competitive advan-
tages through such changes as work rule modifications, wage reduc-
tions, and employee involvement programs.37
A consequence of these changes for the Wagner Act model of
labor law is that bargaining has been decentralized back down
towards the structure of legal bargaining units.38 As a result, the
process of bargaining unit determination has a renewed relevancy
and importance in the contemporary industrial relations environ-
ment. This was absent in the post-war industrial relations system,
where the parties had voluntarily arranged a bargaining structure
that did not correspond with, and to a large degree, bypassed the
33. See SHIFrTING GEARS, supra note 11, at 135.
34. See SBIrTINo GEARS, supra note 11, at 35.
35. See THOMAS A. KocHAN Er AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS (1986).
36. See id. at 144.
37. The recognition of the central role of the negative impact on labor of this loss of the
ability to organize all the firms in an industry and "take wages out of competition" has been
recognized in a number of discussions on the need for labor law reform. See Samuel
Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 3, 13-14 (1993); see, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a
Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CH.-KENT L. REv. 59, 64-66 (1993).
38. See Estreicher, supra note 37, at 10.
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legal bargaining unit structure.3 9 While the legal structure of bar-
gaining units may be more important given this transformation of
the industrial relations system, that does not imply that this struc-
ture is the appropriate one for this new environment. Rather, its
increased significance indicates that it is also increasingly necessary
to consider how the process of bargaining unit determination
should respond to the series of changes that have affected the con-
temporary workplace.
B. The Rise of the Service Sector
One of the major changes in the industrial relations environment
as compared to the early period of the Wagner Act model is the
shift in the industrial structure toward the service sector.40  The
shift in the primary location of employment has meant a shift in the
type of organizational structure in which people work. Whereas a
classic labor law article of the 1950's could state that its "archetype
is a large industrial enterprise employing many thousands of organ-
ized workers in one or more plants, 41 such enterprises no longer
represent the typical workplace.42 This has significant implications
for the continued appropriateness of existing models of collective
organization and representation.43 What may have been suitable
for a work world dominated by large manufacturing plants, may not
be suitable for an environment of small service workplaces such as
retail branch operations.'
39. See Estreicher, supra note 37, at 11.
40. See Estreicher, supra note 37, at 7, 11-12.
41. Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV.
999, 1002 (1955).
42. See generally Howard Wial, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in
Low-Wage Services, 45 RUTGERs L. REv. 671 (1992) (discussing changes occurring in modem
trends of unionism).
43. See id. at 680.
44. Some have argued that the entire Wagner Act model of labor law is outdated given
the shift in industrial structure. The Service Employee International Union "Justice for
Janitors" campaigns have provided an example of service sector organization outside the
structure of the Wagner Act model. See generally Wial, supra note 42, at 692-93 (stating the
successes that these campaigns have achieved is developing a new model of social or
associational unionism that will replace the current workplace centered unionism). While
these developments are suggestive of a possible future path, as of yet the "Justice for
Janitors" type of campaign has only been utilized by a small section of the union movement
in a limited number of cases. Eventually a new model may arise. However, at present the
legal and public policy support for the right to collective representation is primarily centered
in the structure of the Wagner Act model of labor law. Given this reality, it is worth
19981
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Considerations of the relationship between organizing and nego-
tiating units are particularly critical in the service sector because
many companies in it are composed of large numbers of small
branch or retail operations.45 The dilemma for unions in the service
sector is that while it is difficult to simultaneously organize workers
at a larger number of scattered locations, single location units will
generally be lacking in effective bargaining power to negotiate with
a large employer.4" This dilemma was evident in attempts in the
late 1970's to organize workers in the Canadian banking industry.4 7
The banking industry has been historically one of the Canadian
industries most resistant to unionization.48 Two organizational fea-
tures of the banking industry have made bargaining unit determina-
tion essential to attempts to unionize this industry.49 The first
feature is that the Canadian banking industry is highly concentrated
at a national level; being dominated by the "big five" banks.5 0 As a
result, any small bargaining unit will suffer a large imbalance in bar-
gaining power when negotiating with one of the big five banks.5 1
The second feature is that the retail side of banking is conducted
through a large number of small branch locations.52 The workers at
each location have common interests and relationships, yet, they
have been split into small groups.53 Therefore, organization of
these workers is most likely to occur at one small branch at a time.
In 1977-78, the Service, Office and Retail Workers Union of Can-
ada ("S.O.R.W.U.C.") organized a number of branches in the lower
considering to what degree it is possible to respond to the employment situation of service
sector workers within the Wagner Act model. In particular, a system of bargaining unit
determination is needed that allows these workers the opportunity to organize collectively on
a reasonable basis and if they so organize, allows them an adequate degree of bargaining
power to negotiate with their employers on a more equal level. See id. at 681-85.
45. See id. at 694-95.
46. See generally Errol Black & Jim Silver, Manitoba's Experience With Final Offer
Selection: A Comment, 43 LAB. L.J. 318 (May 1992) (explaining that employers have more
power than unions when unions consist of small bargaining units).
47. See S.O.R.W.U.C. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R.
99.
48. See C.N.T.U. v. Nat'l Bank of Canada [1985] 11 Can. L.R.B.R. (NS) 257, 266.
49. See S.O.R.W.U.C. 2 Can. L.R.B.R. at 110-11.
50. See M. Isabel Medina, Note, Regional Interstate Banking - States May Discriminate
Against States Outside Their Geographical Regions in Authorizing Interstate Banking
Acquisitions, 61 TUL L. REv. 196, 213 n.102 (1986).
51. See Black & Silver, supra note 46, at 319.
52. See S.O.R.W.U.C. 2 Can. L.R.B.R. at 112-13.
53. See id. at 119.
[Vol. 15:419
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mainland of British Columbia.54 The bank challenged the branch
level units proposed by S.O.R.W.U.C. on the basis that the only
appropriate unit for banking was a national level, all-employee
unit.55 The Canada Labour Relations Board ("CLRB") accepted
the union's proposal of a single branch as an appropriate bargaining
unit.56 In rejecting the banks proposed unit, CLRB noted that sin-
gle location units had been deemed to be appropriate in the past
and that adopting too large a unit in this case would "abort any
possibility of collective bargaining ever commencing."57 Despite
their success in obtaining the branch as the bargaining unit,
S.O.R.W.U.C.'s attempt to organize the banking industry was ulti-
mately unsuccessful.58 This was partly due to a lack of support from
the broader union movement, but a key factor was also the lack of
bargaining power of the single branch units when negotiating with
the banks. The single branch units that S.O.R.W.U.C. organized as
a result proved unable to win significant benefits for their members,
crippling the organizing drive.5 9
One approach to resolving the problem of the lack of bargaining
power of single branches was to organize on a regional or municipal
basis.6" The CLRB found that a unit composed of all branches of
the National Bank in the municipality of Rimouski was an appro-
priate unit.6 However, in Ontario an application for a unit consist-
ing of seven out of thirty-seven branches of National Trust in
metropolitan Toronto was ultimately rejected after being accepted
at an initial CLRB hearing.62 In this decision, the CLRB empha-
sized that it would not accept as appropriate a bargaining unit that
was based solely upon the degree to which the union had organized
individual branches.63 However, the key restriction on organizing
in the banking industry that S.O.R.W.U.C. had earlier experienced
54. See S.O.R.W.U.C. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R.
99, 100.
55. See id. at 119.
56. See id. at 125-26.
57. Id. at 121.
58. See C.N.T.U. v. Nat'l Bank of Canada [1985] 11 Can. L.R.B.R.(N.S.) 257, 334.
59. See id. at 363-70.
60. See id at 304.
61. See id. at 262, 304.
62. See National Trust (No.1) [1986] O.L.R.B. Rep. Feb. 250; National Trust (No.2)
[1988] O.L.R.B. Rep. Feb. 168.
63. See National Trust (No. 2) [1988] O.L.R.B. Rep. at 174.
1998]
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was not the size of the organizing unit.64 It was the inability to com-
bine the natural organizing units of individual branches into larger
negotiating units that might be able to bargain effectively with the
large banks.6
5
Resolution of this conflict between different effective units for
organizing and bargaining purposes is central to the question of
whether collective bargaining under the Wagner Act model has the
potential to be available as a reasonable structure for collective
organization of workers in the service sector. The consequences of
a failure to address this issue are already becoming evident in
moves by some unions in the service sector to organize workers
outside of the legal structure of the Wagner Act model.66 Most
prominently, the S.E.I.U. in their successful "Justice for Janitors"
campaign was able to organize workers on an industry-wide basis in
different cities in the United States.67 This was accomplished with-
out using any of the procedures established by the Wagner Act.68
Thus, the question of how to provide a structure for reasonable
access to collective organization for service sector workers through
the bargaining unit determination process ultimately may not be
simply one of whether or not to support availability of collective
representation for these workers. Rather, it will depend on
whether or not the system of labor law will have any relevancy to
the collective organization that will occur in any event. An addi-
tional problem that is particularly characteristic of the service sec-
tor is the growth of non-traditional forms of employment.69 This
includes the use of large numbers of part-time, temporary, and con-
tingent employees instead of the predominantly full-time, perma-
nent labor force, characteristic of the large manufacturing
employers that were the archetype of the post-war industrial rela-
tions system. 7° This change in the nature of employment creates a
64. See S.O.R.W.U.C. 2 Can. L.R.B.R. at 119.
65. See C.N.T.U. 11 Can. L.R.B.R. at 363-70.
66. See Wial, supra note 44, at 693-94.
67. See Wial, supra note 44, at 692-93.
68. See Wial, supra note 44, at 697-98.
69. "Low-wage service jobs - jobs in such fields as retail sales, clerical, food preparation
and service, non-professional health care, cleaning service, and personal service work,
typically located in service-producing rather than goods-producing industries - are a
prominent feature of the 'new' American economy." Wial, supra note 44, at 671.
70. For instance, Canadian statistics indicate that in 1990 just over 90 percent of part-
time employment was in the service sector. See RONALD DAVIs, THE OLRB POLICY ON
BARGAITNG UNITS FOR PART-Tims WORKERs 6 (1991).
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problem for the process of bargaining unit determination. A deci-
sion must be made whether to allow these non-traditional types of
employees to form part of the same units as full-time, permanent
employees and perhaps, more importantly, whether the process
allows reasonable access to collective representation for all types of
employees.
A further element in the issue of the changing form of employ-
ment in the service sector is the increasing amount of companies
contracting out various organizational functions.7 Indeed, the con-
tracting out of such functions as janitorial, cafeteria, security, and
payroll services by companies in manufacturing and other industries
is one cause of the shift to increased service sector employment.72
This process of contracting out of services alters the traditional
identification of the employer with the owner and manager of the
workplace.73 The worker may continue to identify his or her
employment with the location where the work is performed and the
group of employees who work at that workplace.74 However, the
employee's contractual relationship of employment may be with a
company that provides services to a number of clients at different
workplaces, none of which the individual employee may have had
any contact with.75 The challenge for the process of bargaining unit
determination is whether a structure developed in the context of
large, stable manufacturing plants can be adapted to this new
context.
C. Multi-Divisional Corporate Forms
Related issues concerning the relationship between the bargain-
ing unit and the corporate structure are posed by the rise of the
multi-divisional corporation as a major type of corporate organiza-
tion.76 Again the key concern is whether the unit determination
71. See Howard Wial, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low-Wage
Services, 45 RuTGERS L. REv. 671, 679 & n.31 (1992).
72. See id. at 680.
73. See id. at 679-80.
74. See id. at 680.
75. See id. at 679-80.
76. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND SmucruRE (1962). Chandler's
work is considered a classic analysis of the rise of the multi-divisional corporate form.
Despite the decades since its publication, it is only recently that the implications of the multi-
divisional corporate structure for employment relations have begun to be more fully
analyzed.
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process allows the development of a bargaining unit that can bar-
gain effectively. Concerns in this area were advanced in the 1970's
with the advent of widespread corporate mergers and conglomera-
tions.77 The fear at that time was that bargaining units would be
too small to have any effective bargaining power when faced with
corporate conglomerates. 78 The inter-industry and international
diversification of investment and risk could reduce the impact of
any individual unit's industrial action.79 This led to some calls for
unit determination to become a mandatory subject of bargaining,
with the hope that this would lead to the merger of units creating
unit structures large enough to bargain effectively with the corpo-
rate conglomerates. 80 While the conglomerate wave of the 1970's
may have faded with the corporate break-ups and sell-offs of the
1980's, multi-divisional corporations have remained an increasingly
significant organizational form.
Recent work by John Purcell and Bruce Ahlstrand has provided
important insights concerning the impact of the relationship
between corporate structure and industrial relations in the context
of the multi-divisional corporation.8" The unitary company func-
tions as an independent unit in external product and capital mar-
kets, with its internal organization based upon functional
departments, such as sales, production, and marketing.8 2 The multi-
divisional company is "organized into divisions and/or business
units with business unit managers made wholly or largely responsi-
ble for operating decisions and for profit generation. '8 3 Profits
earned by divisions in the multi-divisional company are not
retained in the division, but rather are returned to central corporate
funds.84 Senior corporate management is then able to re-allocate
capital across the divisions of the company in accordance with the
77. See Charles Craypo, Collective Bargaining in the Conglomerate, Multinational Firm:
Litton's Shutdown of Royal Typewriter, 29 INDUS. & LAD. REL. REv. 3, 20 (1975).
78. See id. at 21 & n.61.
79. See id. at 22; see also David C. Rose, Are Strikes Less Effective in Conglomerate
Finns? 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 131 (1991) (developing an equation to test
diversification's effect on wages and strikes).
80. See Kenneth 0. Alexander, Conglomerate Mergers and Collective Bargaining, 24
INrDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 354, 369-70 (1970).
81. See JoHN PURCELL & BRUCE AHLsTRAND, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN
THE MuLTI-DrSIONAL ComPANY 2 (1994).
82. See id. at 11.
83. Id. at 2.
84. See id.
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investment priorities developed through corporate strategy.85
While this might appear to be a system that would facilitate the
availability of patient capital for long term investments, in practice
the reverse has occurred. Senior corporate management has used
systems of tight financial controls to increase pressure on divisional
managers to maximize short term returns.8 6
An important effect of the establishment of the multi-divisional
structure is to produce a split in the level at which company strategy
is set. 7 Three levels of strategy in the multi-divisional company
have been described.8 8 First-order strategy concerns the long term
direction of the firm: what markets it will be in; how large it will be;
and what divisions it will establish.8 9 Second-order strategy con-
cerns the relationship between the different divisions of the corpo-
ration, and its internal operating procedures. 9° Third-order strategy
involves the plan for particular areas of functional management,
such as operations, human resources and marketing.91 Within the
multi-divisional company, these different levels of strategy are set
at different levels of the company.92 First- and second-order strate-
gies are set by senior management at the central office.93 Third-
order strategy is developed at the divisional level, where implemen-
tation of these functional management plans also occurs.94 The dif-
ferent levels of strategy are related in a hierarchical manner, such
that there are "cascading sets of strategic decisions in which
upstream, first-order corporate strategies flow downward into sec-
ond-order structural decisions and, further downstream, third-order
employee relations strategies. 95
The key finding from this research concerns the effect of the first-
and second-order decision making on employee relations. 96 Instead
85. See id. at 14.
86. See id. at 76.
87. See JoHN PURCELL & BRUCE AHLSTmAND, HUmAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT iN
THE MULTI-DMSiONAL CoMPAw 42-43 (1994).
88. See id. at 43.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 52.
93. See JoiiN PURCELL & BRUCE AImLSTRAND, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT iN
THE MULTI-DIVISIONAL CoMPANY 43 (1994).
94. See id. at 43.
95. Id. at 52.
96. See id at 45.
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of employee relations operating autonomously in the environment
of the particular operating plant or division, the nature of this envi-
ronment is, in significant measure, determined by strategies set by
senior management at the central corporate offices.97 The separa-
tion of higher-order strategic planning and financial control from
the operational management at the unit or divisional level allows
senior management to determine the financial constraints and
expectations under which the division will operate.98 As a result,
Purcell and AhIstrand suggest "most of the key (strategic) decisions
made within the human resource sphere (what we refer to as third-
order strategy) are, in fact, derivatives of first- or second-order
strategy."99
These findings are of significance for unit determination policy
development. If the policy is designed to promote collective bar-
gaining as a way of allowing employees to bargain over the key
decisions affecting the employment relationship, then it is necessary
to be able to bargain at the level where those decisions are being
made.' 0 Merely bargaining at the divisional level where functional
management is centered may allow employees to bargain over
third-order strategies, such as what the personnel policies will be.'0'
However, it will not allow effective bargaining over the first- and
second-order decisions that set the parameters under which these
third-order strategies are developed. The implication from this
analysis is that if labor law is to facilitate effective collective bar-
gaining concerning the major decisions affecting employees, it must
allow bargaining to occur at a company-wide level where these
decisions are taken, not just at a plant or divisional level.
D. New Forms of Organization of Production
Among the most important challenges to the traditional system
of industrial relations are those resulting from the rise of alternative
systems of production.0 Changing systems of work organization
97. See id. at 52.
98. See id. at 52-53.
99. JOHN PURCELL & BRUCE AHLsTRAND, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE
MULTI-DIVISIONAL COMPANY 63 (1994).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Charles Sabel, Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open Labor Markets: Some
Consequences of the Reintegration of Conception and Execution in a Volatile Economy, in
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and new relationships between firms in networks of production
require a re-evaluation of existing institutional structures of indus-
trial relations. °3 These changes have the potential to fundamen-
tally alter the industrial relations issues that are being regulated in
the process of bargaining unit determination.1 0 4 As a result, the
regulatory effect of the process of unit determination may in turn
be altered. 05 Thus, it is particularly critical to consider the effect of
alternative models of unit determination in the context of these
changes.
In traditional mass production, independent firms produced stan-
dardized products for a general market of interchangeable custom-
ers." 6 In many of the alternative production systems that have
been developed in recent years, the relationship between firms has
been altered such that firms become linked together in supplier and
customer networks. 10 7 For instance, one of the key elements of the
lean production system in the auto industry is the close linkage
between supplier firms and final assembly plants.10 By coordinat-
ing deliveries with demand, it is possible to reduce inventories and
produce the elimination of buffers that is central to lean produc-
tion's maximization of efficiency.'0 9 In order to achieve this coordi-
nation, the work organization of firms in the network is increasingly
tied to that of the central assembly plant."0
A striking example of the effect of changes in the organization of
production is provided by the new Volkswagen vehicle assembly
plant in Resende, Brazil."' This plant is the leading example of the
move toward modular production, in which supplier firms take
responsibility for the production of entire subsystems of the vehicle,
including their installation on the assembly line." 2 As a result of
SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SocmIY 23,24 (Pierre Boudrieu & James Coleman eds.
1991) [hereinafter Moebius-Strip Organizations].
103. See id.
104. See JOHN E. ABODEELY ET AL. THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING
UNrr 135 (rev. ed. 1981).
105. See id.
106. See Moebius-Strip Organizations, supra note 102, at 27.
107. See ErLEEN APPELBAUM &L ROSEMARY BATr, THE NEw AMERICAN WORKPLACE:
TRANSFORMING WORK SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 37-39 (1994).
108. See id. at 135-37.
109. See id. at 34.
110. See id. at 37.
111. See Haig Simonian, Alliances Forged in the Factory, FIN. TumEs, Nov. 4, 1996, at 16.
112. See id.
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this organizational structure, most of the workers on the assembly
line at Resende are not employees of Volkswagen, the owner of the
plant, but of different component system suppliers. 1 3 Only about
twenty percent of the workers at Resende will actually be on Volk-
swagen's payroll; primarily taking responsibility for supervisory
functions such as quality control." 4 A similar approach has been
applied to the organization of production at the Skoda plant at
Mlada Boleslav in the Czech Republic, also owned by Volk-
swagen. 1 5 While these are but a few isolated examples, owing
much to the particular vision of the manufacturer-supplier relation-
ship held by Jose Ignacio Lopez, who as Volkswagen's controversial
head of purchasing and production optimization provided impetus
to the projects, their potential spread poses significant challenges to
existing conceptions of the firm and its relationship to its
workers. 1 6
The significance of these types of cases for the process of bargain-
ing unit determination is that they alter the existing conception of
where the natural groupings of common interest among workers in
different organizations lie. The question that will need to be
addressed is whether the structure of bargaining units can be
adapted to this and other structures of organization of production
that differ from the independent unitary industrial plant. This
problem may become increasingly severe if some of the more spec-
ulative predictions for the organization of the future come true.
One such prediction is that the pressure for flexibility in production
will result in the devolution of corporate functions to semi-autono-
mous units." 7 Linkages between firms will develop as local clusters
of firms work together on particular projects."' An increased blur-
ring of corporate boundaries will occur as organizations become
like "Moebius-Strips," folding into each other with no end or begin-
ning.119 Corresponding to this will be an increasing mobility of
workers. 20 No longer will a homogeneous group of workers be
employed in the same workplace for an extended period of time.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id
116. See id.
117. See Moebius-Strip Organizations, supra note 102, at 27-28.
118. See Moebius-Strip Organizations, supra note 102, at 29.
119. See Moebius-Strip Organizations, supra note 102, at 29.
120. See Moebius-Strip Organizations, supra note 102, at 29.
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Other types of connections between workers will become more
important as the link based upon the office or plant workplace is
weakened.' This description of the "Moebius-Strip" organization
is a speculative extrapolation. However, if firms increasingly do
begin to develop some aspects of organizational characteristics such
as these, it is important that the law of bargaining unit determina-
tion be able to adapt to this development. If organizational and
productive flexibility are the key to competitive success, a model of
bargaining unit determination based upon large, stable organiza-
tional units will be a disadvantage.
Ill. THE NATURE OF BARGAINING UNIT DETERMINATION AND
Two ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Having considered some of the major changes occurring in the
industrial relations environment, it is now necessary to turn to the
legal process of bargaining unit determination and examine it in
more detail. The legal structure for bargaining unit determination
is an amalgam of loose direction from statutes and broad policy
construction by labor relations boards. 22 In this area, the courts
have provided less significant review of labor relations board deci-
sion making than elsewhere in labor law.
The National Labor Relation Board's ("NLRB") discretion in
bargaining unit determination is only given loose guidelines by the
National Labor Relations Act, ("NLRA") which provides that
"[t]he Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed
by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof. .. ."1 Similarly, the relevant provision of the
Ontario Labour Relations Act ("OLRA") states, "the Board shall
determine the unit of employees that is appropriate for collective
121. See Moebius-Strip Organizations, supra note 102, at 29-30.
122. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994); see generally Airco,
Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 348 (1984) (ruling a "plantwide unit of drivers, mechanics, and operators
appropriate"); Metropolitan Life Ins., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408, 1412 n.11 (1966) (stating that "[i]n
attempting to ascertain the groups among which there is that mutual interest in the objects of
collective bargaining which must exist in an appropriate unit," the Board must take certain
factors into consideration).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
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bargaining .... 124 Provisions in other Canadian jurisdictions have
conferred on their respective labour relations boards a very broad
discretion in determining the appropriate bargaining unit.125
The discretion conferred by legislation allows the labor relations
boards broad authority to develop principles and policies concern-
ing bargaining unit determination. Despite this broad grant of dis-
cretion, the labor relations boards have rarely enunciated any
specific rules or principles governing their decision making in this
area. 26 Instead, they have predominantly emphasized that each
case will be decided on its particular circumstances and have
offered lists of factors that they will consider in making these deci-
sions.' 27 Under the rather vague standard of whether the employ-
ees share a sufficient "community of interest" to make them
appropriate as a bargaining unit, the NLRB has considered a list of
factors including: the extent of organizing; bargaining history
between the parties or in the industry; similarity of skills, duties and
working conditions among the employees; structure of the
employer's organization; and the wishes of the employees. 128 Fol-
lowing the lead of the NLRB, the various Canadian labour relations
boards have also all adopted some formulation of the test of
whether the employees in the proposed unit share a sufficient com-
munity of interest to bargain collectively as a unit. 29 While the
above list of factors helps indicate what considerations the boards
will look to, it does not indicate the actual pattern of decision mak-
ing that has developed over time. Applications of the "community
of interest" test have produced a range of decisions concerning dif-
ferent types of workplaces. 30 However, at a broader level, there
are certain common general principles underlying the process of
bargaining unit determination that have been largely unexamined.
124. Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. L.2 § 6(1) (1990), amended by ch. 21, 1992 R.S.O.
363 (Can.).
125. See GEORGE W. ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW, 7.300 (2d ed. 1997).
126. See Jonm E. ABODEELEY ET AL., THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAININO
UNrr 134 (rev. ed. 1981).
127. See id.
128. See PATRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 449 (3d ed., 1992).
129. See Island Med. Lab. v. Health Sciences Ass'n of B.C. [1993] 19 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d)
161, 179.
130. Compare Allen Servs. Co., Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1994) (certifying a unit of
maintenance and cleaners with electricians and mechanics), with Lundy Packing Co., Inc.,
314 N.L.R.B. 1042 (1994) (refusing to recognize a unit of production and maintenance with
technicians as appropriate).
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To understand these common principles it is helpful to consider the
role of the process of bargaining unit determination in the overall
structure of the Wagner Act model.
A. The Nature of Bargaining Unit Determination
As noted above, in labor law the bargaining unit is the fundamen-
tal collective unit of employees. In thinking about bargaining unit
determination, it is useful to consider how another legal entity rep-
resenting a form of organization, the corporation, has been re-
examined in legal theory. One of the major theoretical advances in
company law in recent decades was the re-conceptualization of the
corporation as a nexus of contracts. 31 In contrast to the reification
of the corporation as a legal entity in traditional company law the-
ory, in the nexus of contracts argument, the corporation is viewed
as consisting of a set of contractual relationships between the differ-
ent stakeholders in the corporation. 32 A key benefit of the nexus
of contracts argument is that it counters the idea that the corpora-
tion has an inherent, necessary structure. 33 Instead, the corpora-
tion is viewed as merely a set of rules governing a series of
relationships, rules which can be modified as appropriate. 3 4 The
importance of developing the nexus of contracts argument was that
it provided a point of critique for moving away from a focus in com-
pany law on the corporate entity and its historical form and toward
a re-examination of the regulation of relationships between differ-
ent actors in the corporation. 35
While the contractual aspect is less applicable in the labor law
context, a point of critique similar to the nexus of contracts argu-
ment can be developed when thinking about the bargaining unit. In
labor law as in corporate law, there is a danger of viewing legal
entities as having an inherent historical form and existence as enti-
ties apart from their legal conceptualization. What is referred to in
labor law as the bargaining unit is in reality just a collection of rules
131. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976).
132. See id. at 311.
133. See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual
Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. Rav. 180, 191-93 (1992) (discussing the idea of the nexus of
contracts corporation as being a point of critique rather than a normative foundation for a
contractual structure of the corporation).
134. See id. at 193.
135. See id.
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governing certain aspects of labor relations. Following from this
idea, the bargaining unit can be re-conceptualized as a nexus of
rules governing the relationships between the different parties.
Instead of establishing an entity described as the appropriate bar-
gaining unit, the labor relations board can be viewed as establishing
various rules that impose a set of obligations on the parties and
limitations on the parties' actions by making decisions in this area.
The bargaining unit is not an entity having an inherent and neces-
sary form.'36 It is the set of rules that has been developed as part of
the changing labor law that can and should be modified as
appropriate.
Proceeding from a nexus of rules conceptualization of bargaining
unit determination, the next step is to consider where the rules of
bargaining unit determination are located in the more general
structure of labor law regulation. Katherine Stone has described
labor law regulation as having two major facets.' 37 The first is the
"'constitutive effect' of labor laws." ''  This first facet reflects the
purpose of labor law as allowing employees to organize collectively
for bargaining.'39 Various aspects of labor law reflect this facet by
providing for the conditions under which employees are entitled to
organize.' 40 The second facet is the "power broker effect"'141 of the
labor laws. Under this facet, labor law contains various rules that
determine the relative power of labor and management in dealing
with each other. 42 By establishing obligations and limitations on
the actions of labor and management, labor law helps provide the
basis for the ability of each party to further their respective
interests. 43
Following from Stone's description of the two facets of labor law,
we can describe the bargaining unit determination process as hav-
ing two different roles in the regulation of labor relations. The first
136. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408, 1412 (1966) ("[I]t is well settled
that there may be more than one way in which employees of a given employer may
appropriately be grouped for purposes of collective bargaining.").
137. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure Changing
Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CH. L. RFv. 73, 82 (1988).
138. Id.
139. See id at 82-83.
140. See id. at 83-85.
141. Id. at 82.
142. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 137, at 85.
143. See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 137, at 85 & n.42.
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role relates to the establishment of the electoral district for organiz-
ing purposes. As part of the constitutive effect of labor law, the
bargaining unit affects what collective grouping employees can
organize. The second role is to establish the scope of the unit to
which legal bargaining obligations adhere. In this aspect of the
power broker effect of labor laws, the bargaining unit becomes the
unit to which legal rights and obligations attach in the bargaining
process. This may not, and often does not, correspond to the actual
bargaining structure, but it is the legal unit, not the actual structure,
that determines how this power broker effect of labor law will be
exerted.144
A related argument has noted that the process of certification
does not confer on employees any changes to their substantive
terms and conditions of employment, but rather procedural rights
to compel the employer to bargain and to utilize the strike weapon
in support of bargaining.' 45 It is argued that critics of enhancing the
protection of the right to collective representation fail to recognize
that unions do not have any power as a result of certification to
affect conditions in the workplace, only what is won at the bargain-
ing table.146 Here again, the dual aspects of labor law are evident in
the recognition of the separate stages of establishing collective rep-
resentation and engaging in collective bargaining. 47 Where the
argument needs to be extended, however, is in the question of the
relationship between the dual aspects of labor law. In particular,
the role of law in the construction of bargaining power needs to be
examined further. While the legal limitations on the utilization of
the strike weapon in support of bargaining have been recognized, 48
the legal system also plays a deeper role in the construction of bar-
gaining power through the process of bargaining unit determina-
tion. The unit in which the employees are able to achieve
certification of collective representation will affect the unit in which
they engage in bargaining, and hence their bargaining power deriv-
ing from their ability to engage in collective industrial action. As a
144. See generally Van Wezel Stone, supra note 137, at 86-120 (1988) (describing the shifts
in NLRB jurisprudence).
145. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING Tm WoRKPLACE: TM FuTuRE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 262 (1990).
146. See id. at 263.
147. See Brian A. Langille, The Michelin Amendment in Context, 6 DALHOUSm LJ. 523,
539 (1980) (analyzing the conflict in the dual roles of bargaining unit determination).
148. See WEILER, supra note, 145 at 263.
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result, the relationship between the dual functions of the bargaining
unit determination process in the establishment of collective repre-
sentation and in the regulation of the bargaining process is central
to the role of labor law in constructing bargaining power in indus-
trial relations.
The recognition of the law's role in the construction of bargaining
power was one of the main contributions of the legal realists to
legal theory. Particularly relevant here is Robert Hale's analysis of
the roles of contract and property law in determining bargaining
power.149 The ability or inability in law to enforce particular con-
tracts was recognized by Hale as a key factor underlying bargaining
power in the market. 150 The recognition by various contemporary
labor law scholars of the effect on bargaining power of rules gov-
erning the content of the duty to bargaining and the ability to
engage in strike action parallels Hale's analysis concerning contract
law. 5' Hale extended his analysis to note the relationship between
laws of property and contracts in the construction of bargaining
power. Hale's analysis of the law of property focuses on issues such
as the legal protection of property from non-property owners and
the legal enforcement of the inheritance of property. 52 The law of
property establishes the strength of the property entitlements that
underlie bargaining power in the market. 53 A similar analysis can
be made of the role of the process of bargaining unit determination
in labor law. Like the determination of a property right, the pro-
cess of bargaining unit determination establishes the initial entitle-
ment in terms of the collective unit to which collective bargaining
rights and obligations attach. The consequences of this role of bar-
gaining unit determination in the establishment of initial entitle-
ments that affect the parties' relative bargaining power has
significant implications for the Wagner Act model of labor law that
will be examined further.
149. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. ScI. Q. 470 (1923); see, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic
Liberty, 43 COLuM. L. REv. 603 (1943).
150. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUm. L. REv.
603, 606 (1943).
151. Compare Hale, supra note 150, at 603, with PAUL C. WEILER, GovERmNo Ti-i
WoRKPLAc: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990).
152. See Hale, supra note 150, at 628.
153. See Hale, supra note 150, at 627-28.
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B. Two Alternative Models of Bargaining Unit Determination
As noted above, the relationship between the dual roles of bar-
gaining unit determination is a key aspect of labor law regulation.
Two alternative models for this relationship provide different
approaches to the process of unit determination. The Wagner Act
model as it has developed involves unifying both roles in a common
unit - the appropriate bargaining unit.154 Such a unified model fol-
lows as a logical consequence of adopting a reified model of bar-
gaining unit determination, in which the bargaining unit is
conceived of as a legal entity, rather than a set of rules. Under a
nexus of rules approach, it might still be appropriate to unify both
roles in a common unit, but there is not a necessary presumption
that this should be the case. A second characteristic of the current
predominant model is that the bargaining unit is a static legal
unit. 55 Upon determination of its boundaries, the bargaining unit
will remain the same for future events in the absence of unusual
circumstances. 56 As a consequence, when the question of the
appropriate unit is being initially examined, it is analyzed as if it will
be a stable unit for all future bargaining purposes. Combining these
two key characteristics, the predominant current process can be
described as reflecting a unified-static model of bargaining unit
determination.
As noted above, under a nexus of rules approach it is no longer
necessary to assume that both roles of the process of bargaining
unit determination require a common unit. An alternative model
could involve evaluating the appropriate unit as required for each
function separately. That is not to say that the unit for the electoral
district would then bear no relation to the unit for bargaining pur-
poses. Rather, in initial representation applications, the focus
would be on the constitutive facet of labor law, not on the power
broker facet. Thus the question for initial representation situations
would focus on establishing a unit as an electoral district that would
enable employees to initially organize to commence bargaining col-
lectively. In contrast, for situations where the employees had
already established collective bargaining, the power broker facet of
154. See, e.g., Langille, supra note 147.
155. See Langille, supra note 147, at 543.
156. See Langille, supra note 147, at 543 (quoting Insurance Corp. of B.C. [1974] 1 Can.
L.R.B.R. 403, 406).
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labor law regulation would be more important. The key difference
in a separated model would be the absence of a presumption that
the units in the two situations need be the same. Such a separated
system would be complemented by making the system dynamic,
allowing the unit, or, under the nexus of rules formulation, the rules
governing the relationship, to be modified with changes in the
industrial relations context being regulated. These alternatives of
having a unified-static or a separated-dynamic model of bargaining
unit determination reflect the broader possibilities available under
a nexus of rules conceptualization of unit determination. Which
model to adopt then becomes a question of the public policy con-
siderations, rather than a function of the form of the legal entity.
While the process of unit determination under the Wagner Act
model has predominantly reflected the unified-static model of bar-
gaining unit determination, some exceptions to it have come closer
to reflecting a separated-dynamic model.'57
Under the Wagner Act model, the predominant current approach
to examining bargaining unit issues has reflected the unified-static
model of unit determination.15 This is illustrated by the basic char-
acteristics of how unit determination cases are decided. 15 9 One
characteristic of the predominant current approach is that modifica-
tion of the unit is only allowed under very limited circumstances;
continuity in units is the norm. 60 This is reflected by the strong
emphasis on bargaining history in unit determination cases.161
Using bargaining history as a key factor furthers the goal of pro-
moting bargaining stability, but results in a bias toward a static
model.' 62 As a result, the norm becomes maintaining existing unit
structures, and alteration becomes the exception. Additionally,
while voluntary alteration of bargaining units by the parties to the
relationship has been permitted, taking this issue to impasse in bar-
gaining has not. 63 The limited use of standard weapons of indus-
trial action inhibits the likelihood that change will occur through
157. See cases cited infra note 166 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., JoHN E. ABODEELY ET AL., THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE
BARGAINING UNIT 134-38 (rev. ed. 1981).
159. See id. at 134.
160. See id. at 135.
161. See id. at 134-35.
162. See id. at 55.
163. See Northwood Pulp & Timber Ltd. [1994] 23 Can. L.RtB.R.(2d) 298, 320 (Can.).
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this route. 64 As a result, while in many cases the parties do agree
to voluntary unit modification, the rules governing such negotiated
change reduce the ability of the parties to press for it in bargain-
ing.'65 Again, this reflects a bias in the unit determination rules
toward a static model.
The contrast between the different models of bargaining unit
determination is illustrated by two of the leading instances in which
labor relations boards moved away from the predominant unified-
static model and toward a separated-dynamic model. The first
example is the Libbey-Owens-Ford cases dealing with the utiliza-
tion of unit clarification petitions to merge bargaining units. 166 The
second example of an exception from the general approach to bar-
gaining unit determination is the development in British Columbia
in the Woodward Stores (Vancouver) Ltd.'67 of a special rule to
overcome obstacles to organizing.
Libbey-Owens-Ford:
The NLRB can modify bargaining units through the mechanism
of Unit Clarification ("U.C.") petitions. 68 These petitions primar-
ily involve issues of changes in job classifications 169 and accretions
to existing units.170 In contrast, in Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. a
union attempted to use a U.C. petition to combine three existing
164. See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining A Labor Law for
Unorganized Workers, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 59, 66-67 (1993).
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
166. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1974); Libbey-Owens-
Ford Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 29 (1973); Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 871 (1971); Libbey-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 126 (1968).
167. [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 114 (Can.).
168. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
169. This issue has been particularly important where there are craft based units within a
workplace that may be rendered inappropriate by the advent of a technological change. In
industries such as printing, technological change has produced a blending of job function that
threatens the traditional structure of representation by narrowly defined craft unions. See
Banknote Corp. of America, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 1041, 1044 (1994). The telecommunications
industry has also experienced this change. As the distinction between local and long distance
transmission equipment has disappeared, the need for a separate craft unit for repair
technicians has also disappeared. See U.S. W. Communications, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 854
(1993).
170. Accretions involve the addition of employees to an existing unit where these
employees share a "community of interest" with that unit. Where these employees are
unrepresented, the Board has allowed the employees to vote in a self-determination election
to determine whether they wish to be a part of that unit. See NLRB v. Raytheon Co., 918
F.2d 249 (1st Cir. 1990); JoiiN E. ABODEELY, ET Ai-, TIm NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE
BARGAINING UNIT 119 (rev. ed., 1980).
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units it represented, encompassing different plants of the same
employer, into a single unit.171 One of the existing units included
eight plants and the other two were single plant units. 172 The
NLRB found that both the existing unit structure and the proposed
employer-wide unit structure constituted appropriate bargaining
units. 173 Rejecting the employer's argument that it lacked authority
to use a U.C. petition case for this purpose, the NLRB ordered an
employee self-determination election concerning the issue of which
unit structure the employees wished to be represented in, the
existing units or the new merged unit. 74 In the resulting election,
the employees voted for the merged unit and a unit clarifying order
was issued designating this as the certified bargaining unit. 75
Subsequently, however, the employer refused to bargain with one
of the single plants as part of the merged unit. 76 As a result, the
union filed unfair labor practice charges alleging a violation of the
duty to bargain in good faith.'77 In addressing these unfair labor
practice charges, the Board reconsidered its earlier unit clarification
decision and reversed itself.' 78 Two of its members decided the
Board lacked authority under the NLRA to merge existing units
based on a U.C. petition. 79 Chairman Miller reversed on the basis
that the initial decision went against Board policy.180 The case was
then appealed to the Third Circuit, which found that the NLRB did
have authority to grant a merger of units under a U.C. petition and
remanded the case to the Board for consideration of whether the
merged unit was indeed an appropriate one.' 81 On remand, the
Board upheld its initial decision that the merged unit was appropri-
ate. 82 This Board decision was also appealed, but the Third Circuit
affirmed the Board's decision:
171. 169 N.L.R.B. 126 (1968).
172. See id. at 126.
173. See id. at 127.
174. See id. at 128.
175. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 871, 871 (1971).
176. See id. at 871.
177. See id. at 873.
178. See id. at 871.
179. See id.
180. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 871, 872 (1971).
181. See United Glass & Ceramic Workers v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 31, 38 (3d Cir. 1972).
182. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 29, 30 (1973).
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We therefore see no reason to depart from the doctrine that a
unit determination by the Board should be disturbed only if it is
unreasonable or arbitrary, and that thus the Board may find
appropriate the combination of two pre-existing units so long as
there is evidence that there is a sufficient community of interest
among the workers in the proposed unit to insure that the
merged unit will also be a viable one. While we would not neces-
sarily have made the same determination as the Board ... we
cannot say it was beyond the Board's power.1
83
At the same time as the union lodged its duty to bargain in good
faith charges, it had attempted to merge another single plant unit
into the newly merged ten plant unit."8 A subsequent petition
seeking the merger was dismissed because it was not timely
raised.8 5 Procedurally, a unit determination decision of the Board
cannot be directly appealed to the courts, but rather, it must await
an unfair labor practice complaint predicated on the underlying
unit determination for review. 8 6 As a result, this second U.C. deci-
sion, while based on the same reasoning as the duty to bargain in
good faith decision, was not subject to review by the Third Circuit.
Despite the extremely dubious authority resulting from this second
U.C. decision, it was later used by the Board to support its subse-
quent denial of unit clarification petitions seeking to merge existing
units.'87 Following the initial Libbey-Owens-Ford decision, the
Board had refused to grant U.C. petitions seeking mergers of units
in similar circumstances. 88 In these and subsequent decisions, the
Board placed an emphasis on bargaining history that resulted in a
freezing of existing units and denial of the use of U.C. petitions to
effect a merger of units.8 9 Finally in Southern California Water
Co.,19° the Board explicitly confirmed its effective rejection of the
reasoning in the initial Libbey-Owens-Ford decision, citing in sup-
183. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1195, 1203 (3d Cir. 1974).
184. See United Glass & Ceramic Workers, 463 F.2d at 34 n.5.
185. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. at 875.
186. See United Glass & Ceramic Workers, 463 F.2d at 35.
187. See Temple Square Bus Ctr., 198 N.L.R.B. 1181, 1182 (1972).
188. See id.; Transcontinental Bus Sys. Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 712, 713 (1969).
189. See Transcontinental Bus, 178 N.L.R.B. at 715. The Unit Clarification petition
aspect of Libbey-Owens Ford received some favorable commentary by the Board in White-
Westinghouse Corp., 229 NLRB 667, 676 (1997), affd 604 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
However, in that case the suggested use of the unit clarification petition was to split a multi-
plant unit, rather than a merger of units as in Libbey-Owens-Ford.
190. 241 N.L.R.B. 771 (1979).
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port the second U.C. decision which had not been part of the
appeal to the Third Circuit. 191
The articulation of the Board's rationale for denying the petitions
for merger of units was provided in the second Libbey-Owens-Ford
decision by Chairman Miller: "[O]ur duty to foster stable collective-
bargaining relationships is well discharged by leaving the matter of
changes in size of a multiplant bargaining unit to be worked out by
agreement of the parties."' 92 However, this statement does not
acknowledge that the ability of the parties to pursue such an agree-
ment is limited by the designation under the NLRA of modifica-
tions to the bargaining unit as a permissive subject of bargaining.
More generally, refusing to allow U.C. petitions for merger of
existing units reflects the establishment of a process of bargaining
unit determination by the Board that is based on a static model.
The initial NLRB Libbey-Owens-Ford decision provides an illus-
tration of the alternative of a dynamic model of bargaining unit
determination. By allowing merger of units through the mechanism
of self-determination elections, the NLRB could have established a
process that allowed the bargaining unit to be modified in accord
with the growth and development of the collective organization
among employees. In this case, there was no question concerning
the representational status of the union; it was the certified bargain-
ing representative of the workers in all three bargaining units.'9 3 If
all the existing units were single plant units, the board might have
tried to justify its decision on the basis that there was some labor
relations advantage to single plant units. However, in this case
there already was a functioning multi-plant unit consisting of eight
of the ten plants.' 94 Ultimately, the Board relied on Chairman
Miller's statement of the reason for rejecting the U.C. petition in
this type of case: that the board will not merge existing units, but
rather will only allow merger based on the voluntary agreement of
the parties. 95 By limiting the creation of broader based bargaining
structures to the voluntary agreement of the parties, this approach
in labor law accords with the system of voluntary creation of
broader based bargaining in the post-war industrial relations sys-
191. See id. at 773 & n.11.
192. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 871, 872 (1971).
193. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 126, 126 (1968).
194. See id.
195. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 871, 872 (1971).
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tem. However, by entrenching this approach into the process of
bargaining unit determination, the legal structure that is established
is one of a static model of bargaining unit determination. As will be
examined in more detail later,196 the limitations on use of the weap-
ons of industrial conflict in support of modification of bargaining
units means that, with the end of voluntary agreement on broader
based bargaining structures following the breakdown of the post-
war industrial relations system, the suggestion of leaving the struc-
ture of multi-plant units to bargaining between the parties becomes
an inadequate option for establishing broader bargaining structures.
Instead, the rejection of the approach of using U.C. petitions to
merge units subsequent to Libbey-Owens-Ford becomes both an
illustration and an affirmation of how the process of bargaining unit
determination is based upon a static model.
Woodward Stores:
The Libbey-Owens-Ford case dealt with the static versus dynamic
aspect of bargaining unit determination and the static nature of the
predominant approach. The static and unified aspects are, how-
ever, closely linked. The assumption that the unit will not be modi-
fied in the future with the development of the collective bargaining
relationship affects the analysis process of what the appropriate unit
should be in an initial representation application. 197 If the unit is to
remain static, establishing a unit that will foster future stability in
bargaining will be a more prominent concern than if modification of
the unit in the future is an option.198 The connection between the
two aspects of unit determination was a key factor in a modification
of the unified-static model that was developed in the province of
British Columbia. 199
In British Columbia, labor law went through a period of signifi-
cant change and innovation during the 1970's with the passage of a
new Industrial Relations Act.200 The province's first union-backed
New Democratic Party government and the appointment of a
reformist labour relations board, chaired by Paul Weiler, reconsid-
196. See discussion infra part IV.
197. See Brian Langille, The Michelin Amendment in Context, 6 DALnousm L.J. 523,542-
43 (quoting Insurance Corp. of B.C. [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 403, 406 (Can.)).
198. See id at 544.
199. See generally Insurance Corp. of B.C. [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 403 (Can.) (outlining
the future and present implications of factors in bargaining unit determinations).
200. Labour Code, R.S.B.C., ch. 212 (1979), amended by ch. 82, 1992 S.B.C. 589 (Can.).
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ered many areas of the province's labor law.20 1 The new Board
expressed a policy that favored large employer-wide bargaining
units covering all of the employer's employees in the province.202
While this policy favored stability in collective bargaining and the
reduction in the number of strikes, the Board was soon confronted
with the issue of how to facilitate organizing in the context of a
system based on large stable units.20 3
The need to allow a viable unit for organizing purposes was
addressed in Woodward Stores (Vancouver) Ltd. ("Woodward
Stores").2 °4 The union in that case applied for a unit consisting of a
single department in one store of the chain.20 5 Despite its stated
preference for employer-wide units, the Board certified the unit
applied for on the basis that to do otherwise would prevent organiz-
ing in a traditionally hard to organize industry. 0 6 This differed
from other certifications of small units due to the inclusion of a spe-
cific provision which allowed for the future expansion of the unit as
collective bargaining became better established. "If and when the
Union organizes the employees at the other locations the Board
will enlarge this existing bargaining unit to include them. '2 7 The
Labour Board subsequently reaffirmed this position in Amon
Investments Ltd.20 8 "Further certification applications . . . will, if
the union has the required support, be disposed of by enlarging the
existing unit rather than creating a new additional unit. '2 0 9
In Woodward Stores, the British Columbia Labour Relations
Board established an explicitly separated and dynamic process of
bargaining unit determination.210 The bargaining unit for the certi-
201. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. ofB.C., 1 Can. L.R.B.R. at 405-06 ("This case is a suitable
vehicle in which this Board can begin to explain in some detail the principles which it intends
to use in defining an appropriate bargaining unit.").
202. See id. at 407.
203. See Woodward Stores (Vancouver) Ltd. [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 114, 117 (Can.)
(concerning an application for certification in the largely unorganized department store
industry).
204. [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 114 (Can.).
205. See id. at 115.
206. See id. at 119.
207. Id. at 123.
208. [1978] B.C.L.R.B. No. 39/78.
209. Id. at 20.
210. See Brian Langille, The Michelin Amendment in Context, 6 DALHOUSiE L.J. 523, 549
(1980) (referring to this issue as the "Amon Principle"). While subsequent decisions have
referred to both cases, the author will refer to Woodward Stores Ltd. in this article as the
primary authority for the principle.
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fication application is one appropriate for determining representa-
tion for the purpose of initially establishing collective bargaining.211
The determination of this representation district for certification
applications is separated from the determination of a permanent
unit for future bargaining obligations through the allowance that as
collective bargaining becomes better established, the determination
of the unit for future bargaining questions will change.212 Thus, the
explicitly dynamic nature of the process allows the separation of the
two aspects of unit determination. An important limitation to note
in the Woodward Stores decision, is that it only applies to tradition-
ally hard to organize industries.2 1 3 As a result, its utilization is lim-
ited to cases where it is possible to introduce evidence about
historical difficulties in organizing the industry in which the enter-
prise operates.2 4
IV. THE UNIFIED-STATIC MODEL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
A. The Narrowing of Collective Bargaining
One effect of the adoption of the unified-static model of bargain-
ing unit determination is to restrict the size of bargaining units and
reinforce a limited vision of collective bargaining as dealing with
workplace level issues associated with the personnel function in the
non-union workplace. In this respect, the unified-static model
accords with, and composes part of, the industrial pluralist vision of
collective bargaining as establishing a system akin to constitutional
government for employment relations in the workplace.21 5 While
this industrial pluralist vision provides a clear role for collective
211. See Woodward Stores 1 Can. L.R.B.R. at 120.
212. See id.
213. See Island Med. Lab. Ltd. v. Health Sciences Ass'n of B.C. [1993] 19 Can.
L.R.B.R.(2d) 161, 185 (Can.) (suggesting that some blending of the usual community of
interest approach with the Woodward Stores exception had occurred and was an appropriate
development of doctrine). The Board in that case ultimately reaffirmed the limitation of the
Woodward Stores approach: a relaxed definition of community of interest and provision for
subsequent enlargement of the unit to cases where a "traditionally difficult-to-organize
circumstance," could be proven. Id. at 185. Similarly, when the Ontario Labour Relations
Board decided in U.F.C.W. v. Canadian Tire Petroleum [1994] O.L.R.B. Rep. April 360, to
certify a single gas bar location in a municipal area rather than a more usual municipality-
wide unit, it justified the decision as reflecting "the obstacles to organizing in an industry
which has not heretofore been organized." Id. at 363.
214. See Island Med. Laboratories 19 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) at 185-86.
215. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law,
90 YALE LJ. 1509, 1511 (1981).
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bargaining in the industrial relations system, it also limits this role
from including broader business issues and corporate strategy.216
These areas have been subsequently recognized as crucial to the
ultimate outcomes of the system.217 The role of the bargaining unit
determination model in reinforcing the industrial pluralist vision in
labor law derives from how the unified-static model resolves a ten-
sion in the interests of unions and management in questions of the
appropriate unit.218
The dual role of the bargaining unit as both the representation
district and the negotiating unit creates a tension in the desires of
both the union and the employer concerning what type of unit they
would prefer.219 For the union, a smaller unit is generally prefera-
ble on an initial certification application.22 ° It is easier to organize a
smaller, usually more homogeneous group of workers.22' After cer-
tification, the union would usually prefer as large a unit as possible
to maximize its bargaining power at the negotiating table.222 In
contrast, the employer will usually prefer a larger unit for a certifi-
cation election, so as to make it more difficult for the union to
organize.' Whereas after certification, the employer will gener-
ally prefer a smaller unit that has less bargaining power and a col-
lective agreement that covers fewer employees. 224 As a result, on
applications for certification, a typical case would involve the union
arguing for the smaller single plant unit, whereas the employer
would be arguing for the larger multi-plant unit.2 5 Despite these
positions, if certification is obtained, the union would ultimately
216. See id. at 1547.
217. See id. at 1566.
218. See RONALD DAVIS, THE OLRB POLICY ON BARGAINING UNrrs FOR PART-TIME
WORKERS 23-24 (1991).
219. See Brian Langille, The Michelin Amendment in Context, 6 DALHousm L.J. 523,539
(1980).
220. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product
Markets, 69 Cm.-KmEr L. REv. 3, 10-11 (1993).
221. See id. at 11.
222. See Langille, supra note 219, at 539.
223. See ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 281 (12th ed.
1996).
224. See id. at 281-82.
225. See, e.g., Island Med. Lab. Ltd. v. Health Sciences Ass'n of B.C. [1993] 19 Can.
L.R.B.R.(2d) 161, 164-65.
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prefer a large multi-plant unit, whereas the employer would rather
keep the unit restricted to a single plant.226
The effect of the conflicting interests in questions of representa-
tion and bargaining reinforces a bias in decision making by the
NLRB toward small, plant level units based upon considerations of
the appropriate unit for functions related to personnel administra-
tion and direct supervision of operations.227 Unions are in effect
co-opted into the establishment of this structure due to a vicious
circle trapping them into a narrow structure of collective bargaining
as a result of the unified-static model.228 In order to maximize their
prospects for winning certification elections, unions apply for
smaller bargaining units, commonly single plant units.229 Once
these single plant units are accepted as appropriate and collective
bargaining has become established, under the unified static-model,
the union cannot move beyond this structure of bargaining without
either obtaining a change in the unit from the board," 0 or bargain-
ing for the expansion of the scope of the unit. 3
Despite the assertion of case-by-case decision making and discre-
tion, the NLRB has increasingly, over time, placed an emphasis on
the presumptive appropriateness of the single plant unit.3 2 The ini-
tial reasoning behind the principle that there should be a presump-
tion in favor of the appropriateness of the single plant unit is
somewhat unclear and unconvincing. The precedential authority
cited for the principle can be traced back through a series of NLRB
decisions into the 1940's, with very limited discussion in the deci-
sions of why the principle was adopted3 3 An attempt to provide a
226. See Langille, supra note 219, at 548-49 (quoting Amon Investments Ltd. [1978]
B.C.L.R.B. Dec. No. 39/78).
227. See Dixie Bell Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 631-32 (1962).
228. See Estreicher, supra note 220, at 11; Langille, supra note 219, at 544.
229. See Cox ET AL., supra note 223, at 273.
230. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
231. See Douds v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1957).
232. See Dixie Bell Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 631 (1962); see also Temco Aircraft
Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1085, 1088 (1958) (supporting the presumption that a single plant unit is
appropriate "unless such plant unit has been so effectively merged with another as to destroy
its identity."); Beaumont Forging Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 2200, 2201 (1954) (holding that a single
plant unit should "prevail over other unit types not designated in the statute.").
233. See Haag Drug Co. Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 877 (1968); see also Frisch's Big Boy Ill-
Mar, Inc. 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 553 (1964) (stating that a single restaurant constitutes an
appropriate bargaining unit which will "assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising
the rights guaranteed by the Act."), enforcement denied 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966). The
citation chain can be traced back through Dixie Belie Mills, Inc. 139 N.L.R.B. 629 (1962);
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reason for the presumption was offered in Beaumont Forging Co. 3 4
The Board argued that since the plant unit was one of those enu-
merated in the Act, it must be presumptively appropriate compared
to any unit not enumerated in the Act." 5 The problem with this
argument arises from the use of the words "or subdivision
thereof"'"z 6 in the Act. It might be wrongly assumed that this refers
only to units composed of subdivisions of individual plants. Given
that there is a comma inserted between the words "plant unit" and
"or subdivision thereof, ,,137 the provision should be read as indicat-
ing that the Act is referring to subdivisions of either employer, craft
or plant units. A multi-plant unit will generally either be an
employer-wide unit or a subdivision of such a unit. As a result, it
clearly would lie within the set of units enumerated in the Act.
Therefore, the language of the provision does not indicate that the
single plant should be presumptively appropriate in comparison to
a multi-plant unit.
Despite this origin, the single plant presumption has become a
well accepted part of NLRB policy in bargaining unit decisions."3
More recently, the NLRB has further emphasized and perhaps
expanded the single plant presumption with the suggestion that a
"community of interest inherently exists among such employ-
ees."' 39 To understand what lies behind this acceptance of the sin-
gle plant unit presumption, it is helpful to turn to the reasoning in
decisions that have considered whether to depart from the pre-
sumption and find that only a multi-plant unit, not a single plant
unit, is appropriate.
The primary test used by the NLRB in determining whether a
single plant unit is inappropriate is whether there is such a high
Temco Aircraft Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1085 (1958); Beaumont Forging Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 2200
(1954); In re Hygrade Food Products Corp. 85 N.L.R.B. 841 (1949); and In re Standard
Brands, Inc. 75 N.L.R.B. 394 (1947). Standard Brands neither cites prior authority for the
presumption, nor states it in particularly clear fashion. This dead end is particularly
interesting because Dixie Belle Mills, Inc. and Temco Aircraft Corp. are often cited as the
leading decisions supporting the presumption.
234. 110 N.L.R.B. 2200 (1954).
235. See id. at 2201-02.
236. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
237. Id.
238. See Hamburg Knitting Mills Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1231, 1232 (1979) (stating "that the
presumptive appropriateness of the single plant unit has not been rebutted.").
239. Airco, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 348, 349 (1984).
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degree of "integration or merger of operations""24 between differ-
ent plants as to negate the identity of the individual plants and
make only a multi-plant unit appropriate. 41 As with "community
of interest," a "high degree of integration" is a concept that
requires further definition to provide an informative basis for dif-
ferentiating between when a single plant unit is appropriate and
when only a multi-plant unit is appropriate. On this question, the
NLRB has taken the approach of enumerating a list of factors that
will be considered in deciding cases on their individual merits. In
reaching a decision, the Board will consider "such factors as prior
bargaining history; centralization of management, particularly in
regard to labor relations; extent of employee interchange; degree of
interdependence or autonomy of facilities; differences or similari-
ties in skills and function of the employees; and geographical loca-
tion of the facilities in relation to each other."'242 With the
additional consideration of whether there is a union seeking to rep-
resent a broader unit, this set of factors has served as the basis for
decisions on whether to override the presumptive appropriateness
of the single plant unit.2 43
Among the factors listed, the "centralization of management"
has been given particular emphasis and further elaboration in some
decisions.244 Rather than a broad conception of centralization of
management as including common strategic control or lines of man-
agerial authority, the NLRB has looked to the location of direct
operational supervision and personnel decision making. As a
result, decisions have emphasized the autonomy of immediate
240. Dixie Belle Mills, 139 N.L.R.B. at 632.
241. See id. at 631; see also Temco Aircraft Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1085, 1088 (1958)
(holding "a single plant unit is generally appropriate for collective bargaining purposes,
unless such plant has been so effectively merged with another as to destroy its identity.").
242. Trustees of Columbia U., 222 N.L.R.B. 309, 309 (1976).
243. See Wescom, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1160 (1977); Temco Aircraft Corp., 121
N.L.R.B. 1085, 1088 (1958) (articulating a list of factors, including the situation in which a
union actively seeks a broader unit, that may override the presumption of the single plant).
244. See generally Hamburg Knitting Mills Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1231, 1232 (1979) (holding
separate immediate supervision of daily matters is an important factor when deciding
whether a plant constitutes a unit appropriate for bargaining); Wescom, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B.
1159, 1160 (1977) (explaining that a substantial degree of autonomy in the daily supervision
of employees at the plant and the plant's management doing its own interviewing and hiring
of employees are important factors when deciding whether a plant constitutes a unit
appropriate for collective bargaining); Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 630 (1962)
(emphasizing that each plant's intermediate and immediate supervision is separate, and each
plant has a personnel director who handles hiring, firing, and promotions).
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supervision at the plant in finding a single plant unit appropriate.245
In addition, the ability of plant management to do their own hiring
and firing has been used to support the appropriateness of the sin-
gle plant unit.246 Conversely, in decisions where a single plant unit
was held to be inappropriate, the important factor was the centrali-
zation of the personnel function and the high degree of functional
integration, rather than the mere existence of common managerial
control.247
The emphasis on day-to-day, immediate supervision in determi-
nation of the appropriate bargaining unit indicates a vision of col-
lective bargaining that focuses on the idea of negotiating and
applying rules for the workplace of the type that would be devel-
oped unilaterally by the personnel department in a non-union firm.
This vision of collective bargaining is particularly evident in the
NLRB's 1968 decision in Haag Drug Co. Inc.248 That decision con-
firmed the reversal of an earlier NLRB policy in regard to bargain-
ing units in the retail sector.249 In earlier decisions, the NLRB had
not applied the single location presumption for retail chain-store
operations.20 Instead, the policy was "to find that an appropriate
unit should embrace all the employees within an employer's admin-
istrative or geographic area."'" This policy was initially modified
by the NLRB in Say-On Drugs, Inc.2-52 While there was some initial
245. See Hamburg Knitting Mills Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1231, 1232 (1979); see also Renzetti's
Mkt. Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 174, 176 (1978) (emphasizing autonomous supervision at stores as an
important factor when determinig whether a store constitutes an appropriate unit for
bargaining); Wescom Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1160 (1977) (emphasizing the degree of
autonomy in the day to day supervision of a plant as a determinative factor in deciding if the
single plant unit is appropriate for collective bargaining); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156
N.L.R.B. 1408, 1413-14 (1966) (emphasizing autonomous supervision in offices as an
important factor when determining whether an office constitutes an appropriate unit for
collective bargining).
246. See Wescom, 230 N.L.R.B. at 1160; Dixie Belle Mills, 139 N.L.R.B. at 630 (1962)
(handling matters at a plant such as interviewing, promoting, and firing employees supports
the appropriateness of the single plant unit).
247. See Pickering & Co. Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 772, 773 (1980); see also Cornell U., 183
N.L.R.B. 329, 336 (1970) (holding that a single campus was an inappropriate unit for
collective bargaining because the university's personnel functions so that such a job
classification and the issuance of pay checks were maintained at one campus).
248. 169 N.L.R.B. 877 (1968).
249. See id. (quoting Sav-On Drugs Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 1033 (1962)).
250. See Daw Drug Co. Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1316, 1319 (1960); Weis Markets, Inc., 125
N.L.R.B. 148, 150 (1959); Safeway Stores, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 998, 1000 (1951).
251. Haag, 169 N.L.R.B. at 877.
252. 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962).
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uncertainty over the authority of the change in the Board's policy,
Haag Drug Co. marked the definitive affirmation that the Board
would apply the single plant presumption in the same manner in the
retail sector as it had in other cases.3 In a key passage in the deci-
sion, the NLRB provided an important rationale for deeming the
single location unit an appropriate unit for bargaining:
The employees in a single retail outlet form a homogeneous,
identifiable, and distinct group, physically separated from the
employees in the other outlets of the chain; they generally per-
form related functions under immediate supervision apart from
employees at other locations; and their work functions, though
parallel to, are nonetheless separate from, the functions of
employees in the other outlets, and thus their problems and
grievances are peculiarly their own and not necessarily shared
with employees in the other outlets.
3 54
In this vision, workers come together as a bargaining unit to
respond to the problems and grievances that they share as a group
that works together and is subject to common supervision. While
under this vision, collective bargaining has the potential to produce
joint governance of the day-to-day issues of the workplace, it does
not speak to broader common interests of workers who may work
in different locations, but are subject to the effect of the strategic
decisions of the same ultimate corporate management.
It is important to recognize that it is not simply the presumption
in favor of single plant units that is the significant outcome in this
process. Indeed, there are particular industries and situations
where the NLRB has endorsed other types of units.255 Rather, it is
the limitation of the bargaining unit structure to narrower units
based on personnel function and direct operational supervision con-
siderations that is the key outcome of this effect of the unified-static
model. A similar process has occurred in Canada, where the labour
relations boards have generally had a presumption favoring certifi-
cation of units encompassing all employees of the employer in a
municipality, rather than single plant certifications.2 5 6
253. See Haag, 169 N.L.R.B. at 877. "Our experience has led us to conclude that a single
store in a retail chain, like single locations in multilocation enterprises in other industries, is
presumptively an appropriate unit for bargaining." Id.
254. Id. at 877-78.
255. See id. at 878 n.4.
256. See Insurance Corp. of B.C. [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 403, 407 (Can.).
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The recent Ontario case of Hornco Plastics Inc. v. A.C.T.W1 7
illustrates the same focus on personnel administration issues in the
context of a decision that a single plant unit was too small to be
appropriate.258 Hornco Plastics Ltd. was a wholly owned subsidiary
of Horn Plastics Ltd., which was also a respondent in the case.25 9
Horn operated a plastic injection molding plant in Pickering, Onta-
rio and Hornco operated a similar plant some ten kilometers away
in Whitby, Ontario.260 While the Hornco plant had been estab-
lished under the ownership of a separate company, the two plants
were functionally connected in that the support infrastructure, such
as engineering, accounting and sales, for the Hornco plant was pro-
vided by the Horn plant.261 The union applied to be certified for a
bargaining unit consisting of the workers at the Hornco plant
only.262 In rejecting the proposed bargaining unit, the Board
emphasized the transfer of employees between jobs at the two
plants.263 While employees were assigned to one plant or the other,
job openings were posted at both plants.2" Employees frequently
transferred between the two plants.265 Given the integration in
organization of the plants and the mobility of employees between
them, the Board found that the proposed unit would result in a bar-
gaining structure at variance with the organizational structure of
Horn and Hornco.266
B. Restrictions on the Expansion of Units Through Bargaining
While initial unit determinations may be based upon factors
relating to personnel function and direct operational supervision, it
is the restrictions on the subsequent expansion of units that inhibit
moving beyond these narrowly based units to establish broader bar-
gaining structures. There are two avenues that might be used to
expand bargaining beyond an initial single plant or other narrowly
structured unit. First, once the union has organized other plants
257. [1993] 19 C.L.R.B.R.(2d) 201 (Can.).
258. See idl at 214.
259. See id. at 202.
260. See id. at 202, 203.
261. See id. at 203.
262. See Hornco Plastics Inc. v. A.C.T.W. [1993] 19 C.L.R.B.R.(2d) 201, 206-07 (Can.).
263. See id. at 212.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 212-13.
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owned by the employer, it could return to the Board to seek a new
multi-plant unit to replace the existing single plant unit.267 A sec-
ond option would be to use the process of negotiation and the nor-
mal weapons of industrial conflict that underlie the union's
bargaining power to achieve an expansion of the bargaining struc-
ture by winning an agreement for such a change from the
employer.268 This expansion of the bargaining structure could be
achieved formally through agreement on a broader bargaining
unit.269 Informally, it can be achieved through linking bargaining at
different units and by conducting job action that extends beyond
the individual unit.27 Each of these avenues is, however, signifi-
cantly restricted.
Use of bargaining to achieve broader units is not formally
barred.271 The NLRB has held that the parties are free to agree to
a bargaining unit other than the one specified in the certification.272
The problem with this route to unit change is that changes to the
bargaining unit have been classified as a permissive subject of bar-
gaining." This means the union cannot insist on them to the point
of impasse and use the strike weapon in support of the demand. 74
While it has been held that the parties may agree to consolidate
units for purposes of collective bargaining, respect for the stabil-
ity of industrial relations imported by the Board's determinations
has led to the rule that a party may not be forced to bargain on
other than a unit basis.275
Some authors have argued that the mandatory-permissive dis-
tinction does not affect bargaining outcomes. This is due to the
ability of parties to disguise the reason they take a dispute to
impasse and to make trade-offs between mandatory and permissive
267. This was the approach that the NLRB rejected in the cases following the initial
Libbey-Owens-Ford decision.
268. See Wallace E. Hendricks & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Determinants of Bargaining
Structure in U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 35 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 181, 183 (1982).
269. See id.
270. See, e.g., Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 126, 126 (1968).
271. See 29 U.S.C. § 159.
272. See Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 241 F.2d 278,282 (2d Cir. 1957).
273. The NLRA provides that mandatory subjects of bargaining are wages, hours, and
working conditions. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
274. See John Thomas Delaney et al., Bargaining Effects of the Mandatory-Permissive
Distinction, 27 IwNus. REL. 21, 22 (1988); see, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. NLRB
486 F.2d 1266, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Canterbury Gardens, 238 N.L.R.B. 864, 865 (1978).
275. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 486 F.2d at 1268 (footnotes omitted).
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subjects of bargaining in order to support demands on permissive
subjects.276 Subsequent empirical research supports the existence
of effects on bargaining outcomes of the mandatory-permissive dis-
tinction.2 77 While obviously not preventing agreement on such an
issue, the classification of changes to the bargaining unit as a per-
missive subject reduces the bargaining power of the party seeking
such a change.
The effects of legal restrictions on bargaining are particularly pro-
nounced in the area of changes to the bargaining structure due to
the role of the process of bargaining unit determination in initially
establishing the units that will engage in bargaining.278 Since bar-
gaining unit size itself has a substantial effect on bargaining power,
a union with low bargaining power, due to the small size of its bar-
gaining unit, is particularly unlikely to be able to win an increase in
the size of the unit at the negotiating table.279 Thus, labor law itself
constructs and constrains the bargaining power that is used to sup-
port changes in the bargaining structure. Here again, Hale's insight
that bargaining in the market cannot be conceived apart from the
rules of property establishing initial entitlements and the rules of
276. See Wallace E. Hendricks and Lawrence M. Kahn, The Determinants of Bargaining
Structure in U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 35 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REv. 181 (1982). The
authors present data indicating correlations between bargaining structures and factors such
as industry concentration and plant size. Their analysis includes the assumption that
bargaining structure is an outcome of bargaining and does not account for the effect of the
legal process of bargaining unit determination. As noted above, the assumption that the
classification of bargaining structure as a permissive subject of bargaining has no effect on
outcomes is implausible and contradicted by the empirical evidence. This is not to say,
however, that bargaining will not have any influence on bargaining structure. Rather, the
legal structure significantly constrains what bargaining does occur. Therefore, the type of
correlations that Hendricks and Kahn report should arise as a result of bargaining, even
taking into account the effect of the legal restrictions on such bargaining. An additional, and
perhaps more fatal problem with Hendricks and Kahn's interpretation of their findings is that
their failure to account for the effect of the legal process of bargaining unit determination
ignores the degree to which the type of factors that they describe as determinants of
outcomes of bargaining over bargaining structure are actually taken into account in the legal
process. Labor relations boards can and do consider such factors as plant size in deciding
what will be the appropriate bargaining unit. As a result, it is not possible to separate effects
of bargaining from the effects of the legal process of bargaining unit determination in their
results.
277. See Delaney et al., supra note 274; see also John Thomas Delaney & Donna Sockell,
The Mandatory-Permissive Distinction and Collective Bargaining Outcomes, 42 INDus. &
LAB. REL. REv. 566 (1989) (assessing the distinction between mandatory and permissive
bargaining subjects through experiment data).
278. See Hendricks & Kahn, supra note 276, at 183-84.
279. See Delaney & Sockell, supra note 277, at 568.
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contract governing the enforcement of bargains is relevant.280 To
account for bargaining outcomes, it is necessary to know the initial
entitlements that influence bargaining power."' Under the Wagner
Act model of labor law, the process of bargaining unit determina-
tion helps establish these initial entitlements.282 As a result, the
process of bargaining cannot be viewed as a system separate from
the legal process of bargaining unit determination, and thus is not
an independent determinant of bargaining structure, but rather
must be viewed as an interaction with the legal process in affecting
bargaining structure.
While insisting to impasse on an alteration of the bargaining unit
is clearly a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith, 283 a more
difficult legal question arises in cases of coordinated bargaining. As
noted above in the discussion of the industrial relations system of
the automobile industry, coordinated bargaining is a procedure in
which unions attempt to coordinate the bargaining occurring in dif-
ferent units in order to obtain similar agreements from each set of
negotiations.284 In contrast to pattern bargaining, where unions
attempt to achieve uniform wage rates through successive settle-
ments with different employers, coordinated bargaining allows
unions to achieve an effect similar to an employer-wide bargaining
unit in situations where there are a number of different units for the
same employer. 285 It is permissible for unions to coordinate their
bargaining in different units. The problem arises due to the diffi-
culty of determining whether various bargaining tactics are permis-
sible, or whether they are illegal attempts to force an alteration of
the bargaining unit.
A key support for the establishment of coordinated bargaining is
the right of the employees in the unit to select their own bargaining
representatives. 6 This has been interpreted to include the right to
select employees of other bargaining units of the same employer as
280. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLUM. L. Rv.
603, 627-28 (1943).
281. See id. at 626-28.
282. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNiNG Tm WoRKPLACE: THE FuruRE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 263 (1990).
283. See Douds, 241 F.2d at 283.
284. See SHIFMrln GEARS, supra note 11, at 174-80.
285. See SHIFrING GEARS, supra note 11, at 174-80.
286. See, e.g., NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 599 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1979);
General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1969).
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 15 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 461 1997-1998
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
their representatives. 28 7 However, the employer can refuse to meet
at a single time and place to bargain with all of its different bargain-
ing units at once.2"8 Ultimately, the utility of using coordinated bar-
gaining to achieve employer-wide bargaining is limited. In those
cases where the evidence indicates the union is attempting to
achieve an employer-wide bargaining unit, coordinated bargaining
will be found to be an unfair labor practice.289
An alternative tactic for attempting to exert union influence at a
broader, employer-wide level is to extend job action, and in particu-
lar, picketing beyond the location of the unit. While the Taft-Hart-
ley290 and Landrum-Griffln 291 amendments to the NLRA severely
limit secondary boycotts, it might be imagined that this would not
affect job action directed at other employer establishments involved
in the dispute. However, in its application of the restrictions on
secondary boycotts, the NLRB has confined the scope of union
action through a narrow view of corporate control.2 92
The test applied in the secondary boycott cases is whether there
is sufficient "mutual dependence"293 between the primary and the
secondary employer to make the secondary employer an "ally, "
subject to legitimate boycott, as opposed to a "neutral, "protected
by the secondary boycott restrictions.294 Common ownership of
two subsidiary businesses is insufficient to invoke the "ally" doc-
trine.295 Instead, the relevant issue is common control.296 The
focus on common control was emphasized in another decision,
287. See Indiana & Mich. Elec., 599 F.2d at 190.
288. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 1266, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
289. See Utility Workers Local 111, 203 N.L.R.B. 230, 240 (1973), affd, 490 F.2d 1383
(6th Cir. 1974); see, e.g., AFL-CIO Joint Neg. Comm. for Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 459 F.2d
374, 377-78 (3d Cir. 1972).
290. Ch. 120, tit. 1, §101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
291. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531).
292. See Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69, 185 N.L.R.B. 303, 305 (1970).
293. Miami Newspaper Pressman's Local No. 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405, 407 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
294. See id. at 408-09.
295. See id.
There must be something more in the form of common control, as it is usually
phrased, denoting an actual, as distinct from merely a potential, integration of
operations and management policies. TWo business enterprises, although commonly
owned, do not for that reason alone become so allied with each other as to lift the
congressional ban upon the extension of labor strife from the one to the other.
Id. at 409.
296. See id.
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where the "neutral employer" was not even a separate, commonly
owned subsidiary company, but rather a different division of the
same company.297 In language reminiscent of the single-plant unit
versus multi-plant unit decisions, the NLRB focused on the separa-
tion of day-to-day operational control as a key factor making the
second division a "neutral":
[a]s to the two divisions here involved, the president of the Cor-
poration appoints their heads and delegates to them the responsi-
bility for the day-to-day operation of the divisions, including the
formulation and implementation of labor relations policies. He
may remove them for "an unsatisfactory job," meaning unfavora-
ble earnings.298
The second division was held to be a 'neutral" because control "is
limited to certain financial matters inherent in common ownership
..... 299 More recently, an extension of this reasoning was used to
find picketing of the offices of a holding company that had com-
plete ownership of the primary employer an illegal secondary boy-
cott of a "neutral."300
The secondary boycott decisions provide a particularly striking
illustration of the divergence between the conception of the rela-
tionship between corporate structure and bargaining unit structure
espoused by the NLRB.301 These decisions also implicate the
nature of human resource management and collective bargaining in
the multi-divisional corporation. 0 2 Central management of multi-
divisional corporations are able to retain the ultimate control over
human resource issues in the divisions through their control over
first- and second-order strategic decision making.303 The ability to
exert financial control over the divisions is crucial to this control
over employment relationships that might initially seem to only
depend on divisional management, due to the location of third
order personnel function decisions at that level.30 4 The current
297. See Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69, 185 N.L.R.B. 303, 304 (1970).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See Local 2208, IBEW (Simplex Wire) 285 N.L.R.B. 834, 839 (1987).
301. See id.
302. See JOHN PURCELL & BRUCE AHLSTRAND, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN
THE MULTI-DmsiONAL COMPANY 62 (1994) (discussing the relationship and impact of
corporate strategy and personnel management in multi-divisional companies).
303. See id. at 62-63.
304. See id. at 66.
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NLRB approach severely inhibits unions from influencing the key
first- and second-order decision making that will affect the long
term interests of their members, because bargaining unit structures
are linked and largely restricted to the level at which control over
direct operational supervision and personnel functions occurs.
In contrast to the NLRB, the Canadian labour relations boards
have generally rejected the concept of a distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining.30 5 As a result, it
might be expected that it would be acceptable in Canada for the
weapons of industrial conflict to be used in support of a change in
the bargaining unit. However, the process of bargaining unit deter-
uination has been treated as a special case in this regard.3 0 6 This
was given notable confirmation recently by the decision of the Brit-
ish Columbia Labour Relations Board in Northwood Pulp & Tim-
ber Ltd. v. C.E.P., Local 603.307
In the British Columbia pulp and paper industry, bargaining had
occurred on an industry wide basis for a number of years prior to
the Northwood case.3"' Certifications were held for bargaining
units at individual mills by both the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers
of Canada and the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers'
Union.30 9 On the employer side, the Pulp and Paper Industrial
Relations Bureau became the accredited employers' organization
for industry level bargaining in 1970.310 In 1985, however, the
Bureau was de-accredited upon the unanimous application of its
employer members.31
De-accreditation was the first step in a movement by the employ-
ers away from industry level bargaining. Following de-accredita-
tion, individual employers were no longer required to engage in
joint bargaining.312 In subsequent bargaining rounds, the employ-
ers continued to engage in an industry level bargaining round based
on the terms of voluntary protocols negotiated for each round of
305. See Northwood Pulp & Tmber Ltd. v. C.E.P., Local 603 [1994] 23 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d)
298, 314 (Can.).
306. See id. at 314-15.
307. [1994] 23 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) 298 (Can.).
308. See id. at 300-01.
309. See id. at 299-300.
310. See id. at 300.
311. See Northwood Pulp & Timber Ltd. v. C.E.P., Local 603 [1994] 23 Can. L.R.BR(2d)
298, 300-01 (Can.).
312. See id. at 301.
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bargaining. 13 This situation came to an end in 1994, when the
employers refused to engage in bargaining at the industry level and
demanded that the union locals bargain at the enterprise level,
which corresponded to the certified bargaining units.3 14 The unions
refused to engage in negotiations at the bargaining unit level and
insisted on an industry level format for bargaining.315 The employ-
ers then filed a failure to bargain in good faith application with the
Board.316
The Board's analysis centered around the question of whether
the format of bargaining could be negotiated at the bargaining
table.317 In essence, the issue was whether the unions could insist
on industry level bargaining and use the strike weapon to support
their demands at the negotiating table.318 The alternative was for
the format of bargaining to be alterable only through a voluntary
agreement of the parties, which neither party could use economic
pressure to achieve. The Board decided in favor of the employers;
holding that for the unions to push the issue of the format of bar-
gaining to an impasse was a failure to bargain in good faith.319
It might seem that this decision contradicts the static model of
bargaining unit determination. After all, the Board supported the
employers in their effort to change the format of bargaining from
the industry level to the enterprise level.32 ° However, the reasoning
behind this decision centered on the idea that the statute gave the
Board the discretion to decide the format of bargaining through the
process of bargaining unit determination.3 21 For one of the parties
to insist on altering this legal bargaining structure through bargain-
ing to impasse was inconsistent with the scheme of the statute.3 22
As a result, the Board ordered bargaining based on the bargaining
units determined at the original certification applications, despite
313. See id. at 309.
314. See id. at 304-05.
315. See id. at 305.
316. See Northwood Pulp & Tmber Ltd. v. C.E.P., Local 603 [1994] 23 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d)
298, 298 (Can.).
317. See id. at 309-14.
318. See id. at 309.
319. See id. at 320.
320. See id.
321. See Northwood Pulp & Tmber Ltd. v. C.E.P., Local 603 [1994] 23 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d)
298, 318-19 (Can.).
322. See id.
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the intervening decades of industry level bargaining.323 This deci-
sion represents an affirmation, not a negation, of the static nature
of the legal process of bargaining unit determination.
V. ELEMENTS OF AN ALTERNATIVE
SEPARATED-DYNAMIC MODEL
A. Unit Merger Provisions
In contrast to the unified-static model which characterizes the
current system, a system of bargaining unit determination which is
fully based on the separated-dynamic model does not yet exist.
However, some of the existing exceptions provide elements of the
bargaining unit determination process that are based on a sepa-
rated-dynamic model.324 Examining these exceptions provides an
indication of possible elements of a process of bargaining unit
determination based on a separated-dynamic model.
The first NLRB Libbey-Owens-Ford decision allowing a U.C.
petition to be used to merge multiple bargaining units of the same
employer provides an example of the incorporation of a dynamic
element into the process.3Z5 While this was an isolated decision in
the NLRB's jurisprudence, a similar modification was recently
introduced on a more general basis through legislative amendment
in Ontario. 26
Even though examples of labour relations boards that grant con-
solidation of bargaining units in circumstances similar to those in
Libbey-Owens-Ford do exist in Canada,327 these have not reflected
the general practice.32 Instead, the emphasis in bargaining unit
323. See id. at 320.
324. See, e.g., Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 126 (1968); Toronto Non-
Profit Housing Corp. (City of) [1982] O.L.R.B. Rep. Feb. 280 (Can.); O.K. Economy Stores,
[1990] 7 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) 286 (Can.).
325. 169 N.L.R.B. 126 (1968).
326. See Ontario Labor Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. L-2, § 7 (1992) (Can.).
327. See, e.g., O.K Economy Stores, 7 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) at 291 (allowing an application
for consolidation of five bargaining units each consisting of a separate supermarket owned by
O.K. Economy Stores Limited); Starbucks Corp. v. CAW, Local 2000 [1997] B.C.L.R.B. Dec.
No. B231/97 (giving industrial stability more weight than community of interest in an
application to merge units); Starbucks Corp. v. CAW, Local 3000 [1996] B.C.L.R.B. Dec. No.
B323/96 (citing industrial stability as the key factor in unit determination decisions after an
initial unit has been certified).
328. See, e.g., Toronto Non-Profit Housing., O.L.R.B. Rep. Feb. at 282 (holding that the
Ontario Labour Relations Board does not have the power to order consolidation of existing
bargaining units).
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determination has been on the bargaining history and stability of
existing unit structures.32 9 With the absence of a more general
move by the labour relations boards toward a dynamic model of
union determination, the most significant Canadian development
allowing for the freer merger of units took place through legislative
initiative.330
Following the election of a New Democratic Party ("NDP") gov-
ernment in Ontario in 1990, a series of amendments to the OLRA
were made with the support of organized labor. 31 In the area of
bargaining unit determination, "the Board may combine two or
more bargaining units consisting of employees of an employer into
a single bargaining unit if the employees in each of the bargaining
units are represented by the same union. ' 332 While the Board pre-
viously could alter existing units as part of its general decision mak-
ing power, it was not routinely done. In contrast, the enactment of
specific provisions for combination of units was interpreted as
authority to order the combination of units on a relatively routine
basis considering "whether the consolidated unit sought would, at
least to some extent, facilitate viable and stable collective bargain-
ing, reduce fragmentation, or cause serious labour relations
problems. 333 More restrictive provisions were included for manu-
facturing operations.334 Only the three criteria noted above were
relevant, for applications to other industries, whereas for manufac-
turing operations, the Board was instructed not to combine units
where combination would interfere with "the employer's ability to
continue significantly different methods of operation or produc-
tion ' 33 5 or interfere with the "employer's ability to continue to
operate those places as viable and independent businesses. ''336
329. See O.K. Economy Stores, 7 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) at 290.
330. See An Act to amend certain Acts concerning Collective Bargaining and
Employment, R.S.O., ch. 21 § 7 (1992) (Can.).
331. See An Act to amend certain Acts concerning Collective Bargaining and
Employment, R.S.O., ch. 21 (1992) (Can.).
332. An Act to amend certain Acts concerning Collective Bargaining and Employment,
R.S.O., ch. 21 § 7(1) (1992) (Can.).
333. IBEW Local 636 v. Mississauga Hydro-Elec. Comm'n [1993] O.L.R.B. June 523,532.
334. See An Act to amend certain Acts concerning Collective Bargaining and
Employment, R.S.O., ch. 21 § 7(4)(a),(b) (1992) (Can.).
335. An Act to amend certain Acts concerning Collective Bargaining and Employment,
R.S.O., ch. 21 § 7(4)(a) (1992) (Can.).
336. An Act to amend certain Acts concerning Collective Bargaining and Employment,
R.S.O., ch. 21 § 7(4)(b) (1992) (Can.).
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As with the NLRB's temporary move toward a more dynamic
model in Libbey-Owens-Ford, the Ontario changes were of limited
duration. Following the election of a Progressive Conservative gov-
ernment in Ontario in 1995, all of the amendments to the OLRA
introduced by the New Democratic Party were repealed, including
the bargaining unit combination provisions.337 Apart from its obvi-
ous impact on labour relations in the province at least at the present
time, this reversion in the law limits an evaluation of what the wider
impact of the combination provisions would have been.338
B. Confronting the Representation-Bargaining Tension: The
Woodward Stores Approach
While the unit merger processes examined would introduce a
dynamic element into the process of bargaining unit determination,
they do not directly respond to the role of the bargaining unit in
relation to organizing questions. In contrast, the Woodward Stores
decision demonstrates the tension between the representation and
the negotiating roles of the bargaining unit.339 The result is the best
current example of bargaining unit determination based on a sepa-
rate and dynamic model.340 As noted earlier, the key elements in
that case embodying these principles were: the creation of a repre-
sentation district based upon a relatively small group of workers
representing a reasonable unit for workers who wished to organize
in an industry which has traditionally been hard to organize; and
the explicit allowance for subsequent alteration of the bargaining
unit to create a broader bargaining structure as collective bargain-
ing became better established.34'
If adopted by the NLRB, the Woodward Stores decision presents
a question of statutory violation under the NLRA concerning the
extent of the organizing process as a controlling factor in unit deter-
337. See Greg Crone, Bill 40 Dies Amid Controversey, WNDSOR STAR, Nov. 1, 1995, at
Al.
338. See generally Joseph Liberman & Lorne A. Richmond, Labour: The Legacy of
Labour Law Reform Bill 40, One Year Later, 1994 CAN. BAR Ass'N (discussing the Ontario
combination provisions and the concerns it raised over the potential long term impact on
bargaining power).
339. See, e.g., Woodward Stores (Vancouver) Ltd. [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 114, 119-20.
340. See Brian Langille, The Michelin Amendment in Context, 6 DALHousiE L.J. 523,
546, 548 (1980).
341. See Woodward Stores I Can. L.R.B.R. at 119-20; Amon Invs. Ltd., [1978] B.C.L.R.B.
Dec. No. 39/78 (Can.).
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mination.342 This restriction was introduced with the Taft-Hartley
amendments to the NLRA in 1947.143 Under section 9(c)(5) of the
NLRA, the extent of union organizing could not be controlling of
bargaining unit determinations by the NLRB.3 44 The effect of this
provision is somewhat limited, however, because it allows for the
extent of organizing to be one of a number of factors in determining
the appropriate bargaining unit.345 When considering whether a
unit is appropriate there will generally be a range of factors, in
addition to the extent of organizing, that the NLRB can look to.34 6
The Board in Woodward Stores carefully stated that it would not
"carve out totally artificial units, based solely on the extent of
organization by the union [but would] require some reasonably
coherent and defensible boundaries around the unit over and above
the existing, momentary preference of the employees."347 This cau-
tion is itself a recognition of the degree to which the exception
focuses on the organizing aspect of unit determination. However, it
would be wrong to view the Woodward Stores decision as being
based on the actual extent of organizing. Rather, it seeks to deter-
mine a reasonable standard for collective organizing in the context
of the type of industry involved. The test is not a subjective one
based on the extent of organizing by this particular union, but
rather is an objective test based on what the Board views as a rea-
sonable unit for the employees to use for purposes of organizing
and deciding whether they want to be collectively represented by
the union. Thus, the existence of section 9(c)(5) should not bar the
NLRB from incorporating the Woodward Stores approach into its
process of bargaining unit determination.
As noted above, an important limitation on the Woodward Stores
decision is that it only applies to traditionally hard to organize
industries. 4 8 As a result, its utilization is limited to cases where it is
possible to introduce evidence about historical difficulties in
342. See 29 U.S.C. §159(c).
343. Ch. 120, tit. 1, §101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
344. See 29 U.S.C. §159(c)(5); see also NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 437,
442 (1965) (holding that "the provision was not intended to prohibit the Board from
considering the extent of organization as one factor, though not the controlling factor, in its
unit determination.").
345. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408, 1418 (1966).
346. See id.
347. Woodward Stores, 1 Can. L.R.B.R. at 119.
348. See id. at 118.
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organizing the industry in which the enterprise operates.3 49 A natu-
ral question arising from this approach is: why, given that certifica-
tion occurs on an employer by employer basis, the Woodward
Stores decision should be limited to cases where there has tradition-
ally been low levels of organization in the industry? If the rule is
designed to protect employees' right to organize, its invocation
should depend on the situation of the group of employees in ques-
tion rather than on the historical status of unionization in the indus-
try. In contrast to the existing restriction of the exception to
traditionally hard to organize industries, under a more general sep-
arated-dynamic model, the Woodward Stores approach could be
available in all unit determination cases.
Some of the significance of adopting a fully separated-dynamic
model of bargaining unit determination based on the Woodward
Stores approach, as opposed to just the dynamic element introduced
through the unit merger systems, is illustrated by the Hornco
case. 50 In Hornco, the Board was concerned that a single plant
unit would cause problems due to the linkages in personnel admin-
istration between the two plants.35 1 In a separated-dynamic system
based on the Woodward Stores approach, the first issue would be to
create an appropriate representation district to permit the workers
to organize collectively if they so choose and to promote the initial
establishment of collective bargaining. The proposed single plant
unit would be appropriate for such a situation. If at a subsequent
date both plants were organized, the union could then apply for a
unit consisting of all employees at both plants. In contrast, the sec-
tion 7 combination power that the New Democratic Party amend-
ments incorporated into the OLRA would not necessarily address
this situation. Problems may develop if initial representation deci-
sions establish bargaining units that do not correspond to the
groups in which workers would reasonably be expected to collec-
tively organize.352 In this case, the structure of individual, physi-
cally separated single plant workplaces, significantly diminishes the
utility of dynamic unit merger provisions. 3  Absent a structure
349. See, e.g., Amon Invs. Ltd. [1978] B.C.L.R.B. Dec. No. 38/78.
350. See Hornco Plastics Inc. v. A.C.T.W. [1993] 19 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) 201, 206 (Can.).
351. See id. at 214.
352. See Liberman & Richmond, supra note 338, at 5-6 (quoting Mississauga Hydro-Elec.
Comm'n., [1993] O.L.R.B. Rep. June 523 (Can.)).
353. See Woodward Stores, 1 Can. L.R.B.R. at 120.
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that allows initial representation, provision for merger of existing
units loses its utility. This limitation to the reforms embodied in the
section 7 combination provisions indicates the potential problem of
relying only on specific legislative changes as opposed to a more
general shift in the model of bargaining unit determination underly-
ing the jurisprudence of the labour relations boards.354
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF A SHIFT TO A
SEPARATED-DYNAMIC MODEL
Shifting to a separated-dynamic model would alter how the pro-
cess of bargaining unit determination responds to changes in the
industrial relations environment. Questions about the structure of
representation and bargaining are implicated in the issues of
increased service sector employment, different types of corporate
structures, and new forms of work organization, as previously dis-
cussed above. The current unified-static model of unit determina-
tion creates limitations in the ability of the systems of labor law,
based on the Wagner Act, to respond to these issues. In contrast,
the elements of a separated-dynamic model that have been
examined could provide an alternative way for labor law to respond
to these changes which would increase the availability of access to
effective collective bargaining in this new environment.
A. Collective Representation in the Service Sector
Both the availability of unit merger and a method of achieving
representation based on the Woodward Stores approach would have
an effect on the problem of developing a process for effective col-
lective representation in the context of service sector employ-
ment." Given the common retail outlet and branch structure of
organization in this sector, a crucial question is whether to allow the
combination of the more natural workplace level unit for initial col-
lective organization with the broader based structures needed for
effective bargaining with large service sector employers.356 A pro-
cess of bargaining unit determination based on a unified-static
model would inhibit this combination, whereas a process based on a
separated-dynamic model would facilitate it. The struggles of
354. See id. at 120.
355. See Langille, supra note 340, at 545-46.
356. See Langiflle, supra note 340, at 544.
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S.O.R.W.U.C. provide a clear example of how a separated-dynamic
system might have allowed more effective collective organization of
workers in this sector.357 The ability of S.O.R.W.U.C. to organize
bank workers at the branch level was appropriately supported by
the determination that a branch was an appropriate unit to serve as
a representation district.3 58 However, this should not have pre-
vented the subsequent combination of units to achieve a broader
level bargaining unit that would have served as a more effective
negotiating structure. The recent organizing drive by the Canadian
Auto Workers union among Starbucks coffee shops in British
Columbia will serve as a test for the future potential of merged
units. The initial unit consisted of four stores in downtown Vancou-
ver.359 The British Columbia Labour Relations Board varied the
certification to include additional units. 6 ° In July 1997, a collective
bargaining agreement was reached that covered nine of the ninety
Starbucks' stores in British Columbia. 61 This situation illustrates
the possibility for successful organizing in the service sector based
on a separated dynamic model of bargaining unit determination.
An important question for the future will be whether the unit
organized on this basis is sustainable and has the potential for con-
tinued expansion.
In addition to allowing merger of units to achieve more effective
broader based bargaining structures, a shift to a separated-dynamic
model of unit determination would address some of the difficulties
associated with organizing in the context of the service sector. 362 It
is significant that Woodward Stores itself was a case dealing with
workers in a service industry that had traditionally proved hard to
organize. In the context of a large department store in Wood-
ward Stores the initial process of collective organization by the
employees occurred on the basis of the individual department that
357. See Langille, supra note 340, at 549.
358. See Langille, supra note 340, at 550 (quoting Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
[1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 99, 123 (Can.)).
359. See Starbucks Corp. v CAW, Local 3000 [1996] B.C.L.R.B. Dec. No. B231/96.
360. See id.
361. See Lisa Pemberton-Butler, Starbucks, Union OK Wage Pact- B.C. Workers to Vote
Monday on Contract, SEArLI TimEs, July 11, 1997, at D1.
362. See generally JOHN E. ABODEELY, ET AL., THE NLRB & THE APPROPRIATE
BARGAINING UTrr 127-31 (1980) ("[W]here there is an alleged accretion to the existing
bargaining unit, the clarification procedure has been valuable. It has provided the flexibility
necessary in a dynamic employment relationship.").
363. See Woodward Stores (Vancouver) Ltd. [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 114, 118 (Can.).
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constituted their own work unit.36 4 While it is possible that given
greater familiarity with collective representation, or a broader
organizing drive by a union, a unit of all of the employees in the
store might have sought collective representation, the question is
whether the grouping of employees that did seek representation
should be allowed to do so on that basis. A separated-dynamic pro-
cess of unit determination would allow access to collective repre-
sentation on this basis, whereas the current unified-static process
does not.365
Related issues arise in the context of the expansion of non-tradi-
tional forms of employment in the service sector. In dealing with
this question, the focus has often been on whether or not these
employees should be included in the same bargaining unit as per-
manent, full-time employees.366 The concerns with combining the
two groups include: the prevention of full-time employees having
access to collective bargaining, due to their wishes being vetoed by
large numbers of casual employees with lesser attachment to the
workplace or interest in collective bargaining; dilution of the bar-
gaining strength of the unit due to lack of common interests
between the two groups, reducing support for common action; and
the danger of the employer's operations being excessively disrupted
by industrial action initiated by employees with little long term con-
nection or commitment to the business. 367 While these considera-
tions have been used to justify exclusion of part-time and
temporary employees from bargaining units, this raises the concern
that such exclusions deny these employees access to collective rep-
resentation, and reinforces the inferiority of their conditions of
employment.3 68 Given the concentration of women in these non-
traditional forms of employment, this limitation on their access to
collective bargaining helps reinforce the gender inequality in
employment and is an indication of the failure of the Wagner Act
364. See id at 117.
365. See SIon-rG GEARs, supra note 11, at 189-90.
366. See Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. B.C. Gov't Employees Union [1991]
15 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) 86, 87 (Can.) [hereinafter C.I.B.C.].
367. See id. at 88.
368. See RONALD DAVIS, Tim OLRB POLICY ON BARGAInING UNSIS FOR PART-TnwE
WORERPS 24 (1991) (critiquing the effect of bargaining unit determination in the context of
the Ontario Labour Relations Board's separation of and refusal to consolidate part-time and
full-time employee units).
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model of labor law to respond adequately to the development of an
increasingly feminized workforce.369
One response to the rise of non-traditional forms of employment
is to include these employees in the same bargaining units with per-
manent, full-time employees.370 This route has been taken in some
board decisions37 1 and through legislative initiative in Ontario.372
The creation of such all-employee units however, still raises the
problem of restriction of access to collective representation for both
types of employees.373 If there are genuine divergences of interests
between the two groups, then different concerns and issues could
underlie desires for collective representation.374 Thus, the two
groups could choose to seek collective representation at different
points in time based on these different interests.375 If both groups
did choose collective representation, they may or may not subse-
quently want to combine into a common bargaining unit to negoti-
ate their conditions of employment. A separated-dynamic model of
bargaining unit determination could respond to this type of process
by allowing such a progression in the development of collective bar-
gaining, through initial certification, based on the groupings of com-
mon interest among the employees, with the potential for future
merger of the units as the collective bargaining relationship devel-
ops. 376 In contrast, existing reform efforts based on considerations
of an either/or choice between separate or combined units for tradi-
tional and non-traditional types of employees reflect a presumption
of a unified-static model of unit determination. As a result, the
369. See Judy Fudge, Fragmentation and Feminization: The Challenge of Equity for
Labour Relations Policy, in WOMEN AND CANADLN PUBLIC POLICY 57, 68-69 (Janine
Brodie, ed., 1996).
370. See id. (explaining how the extension of collective bargaining rights to the public
sector dramatically increased the number of unionized workers and had a profound impact
on the unionization of women).
371. See C.I.B.C. 15 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) at 88-89.
372. See An Act to amend certain Acts concerning Collective Bargaining and
Employment, R.S.O., ch. 21 § 6(2.1) (1992) (Can.). "A bargaining unit consisting of full-time
employees and part-time employees shall be deemed by the Board to be a unit of employees
appropriate for collective bargaining." Id.
373. See DAvis, supra note 368, at 21-24.
374. See DAvis, supra note 368, at 21-24.
375. See DAVIs, supra note 368, at 21-24.
376. See Woodward Stores 1 Can. L.R.B.R. at 120; see, e.g., CAN. CoNsT. (Constitution
Act 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §15(1); DAvis, supra note 368,
(advocating use of the Woodward Stores Ltd. approach to address the problem of bargaining
units for part-time workers).
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existing reform efforts are inadequate to respond to these changing
forms of employment.
Following the Woodward Stores approach, a separated-dynamic
model could also alter how labor law responds to changes in the
structure of how the employee relates to his or her workplace in the
service sector. This is illustrated by a recent case from British
Columbia where the Woodward Stores exception was not utilized
due to a lack of evidence that the industry in question fell into the
"traditionally hard to organize" category.37 7 Moonlight Building
Maintenance Ltd. ("Moonlight") involved an application for certifi-
cation on behalf of employees of a janitorial services company.378
The employers Moonlight Building Maintenance Ltd. and Dynamic
Maintenance Ltd. named in the applications in the case, were
closely related companies that employed between 75-100 and 140-
170 workers respectively in the lower mainland of British Colum-
bia.379 These companies provided janitorial services for a number
of buildings in the lower mainland area.380 Some of its workers
were assigned to a particular location on a continuous basis, while
others were assigned to different locations on a routine replacement
or supplemental basis.38'
S.E.I.U. applied for certification of a bargaining unit consisting of
the employees who worked daily at the Sinclair Centre, providing
janitorial services.382 There was a definable group of Dynamic
employees whose regular workplace was the Sinclair Centre.383
There were additional Dynamic employees assigned to work at the
Sinclair Centre on an occasional, but routine basis.384 While it is
not stated explicitly in the case, the inference can be made that the
union had sufficient support within the proposed unit, but not
within Dynamic as a whole.
In rejecting the proposed bargaining unit, the Industrial Rela-
tions Council emphasized that a "fragmented bargaining-unit
approach is inappropriate. 3 85 As a result of the movement of
377. See Moonlight Bldg. Maint. Ltd. [1990] 10 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) 14, 17 (Can.).
378. See id. at 15.
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See id. at 16.
382. See Moonlight Bldg. Maint. Ltd. [1990] 10 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) 14, 15 (Can.).
383. See id. at 16.
384. See id.
385. Id. at 19.
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employees between different locations, the Council concluded that
it was not appropriate for collective bargaining to occur on a single
worksite basis. 86 In other words, the Council rejected the pro-
posed bargaining unit because the initial representation district that
the union had proposed did not constitute an appropriate structure
for ongoing bargaining.
Moonlight and Dynamic provide examples of the type of
employer that has emerged in the service sector who contract out
service functions to many companies. Instead of companies having
janitors as employees for the buildings they own, janitorial service
companies, such as Moonlight and Dynamic, can provide those
services. Workers may still identify their work with their work loca-
tion, but this may no longer correspond to the organizational struc-
ture of their legal employer. What should have been recognized in
the Moonlight case was that the mode in which these janitors
grouped themselves was based upon the location where they
worked and not based upon the structure of their legal employer.
The Board in Moonlight argued that other janitorial service compa-
nies had been organized and that an all-employee unit was more
appropriate in allowing stability of terms and conditions of employ-
ment, despite changing service contracts.3 87 However, viewing the
work location unit as inconsistent with an all-employee unit reflects
the reliance on the unified-static model in bargaining unit determi-
nation. Under a separated-dynamic model it would be possible to
allow a work location unit to be certified as an initial unit. After
collective bargaining has become established it can be altered to
allow an all-employee unit.
It is worth noting again in the context of this discussion that the
janitorial service industry has been the site of the recent prominent
efforts to organize outside of the NLRA in the S.E.I.U. Justice for
Janitors campaign. 8 In the absence of legal mechanisms to
achieve the broader based bargaining that workers in this type of
industry need, it should be no surprise that they have turned to
organizing techniques outside of the structure of the Wagner Act
386. See id. at 20.
387. See Moonlight Bldg. Maint. Ltd. [1990] 10 Can. L.R.BR.(2d) 14, 20 (Can.).
388. See Howard WiaI, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low-Wage
Services, 45 RUTGERS L. RPv. 671, 693-94 (1992).
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model.3 89 While there are other aspects of the NLRA that have
also discouraged workers from organizing under its structure, the
existing unified-static process of unit determination is one that
would provide a reasonable basis for skepticism of its utility to
these workers.390
B. Employer Corporate Structure
As discussed above, in contemporary multi-divisional companies,
many of the crucial decisions affecting workers are products of
strategy set at the central corporate level, far from the plant or divi-
sional unit that is the focus of more immediate administration of
the employment relationship. 391 In the absence of bargaining struc-
tures which cover all employees in these multi-divisional compa-
nies, the danger is that individual plant or divisional units of
workers will be relegated to respond to the financial constraints
established by central corporate strategy without an opportunity to
bargain over the strategy that produces these constraints.392 While
other restrictions exist concerning bargaining over issues of busi-
ness strategy,393 these problems are compounded when bargaining
is not even occurring at the level of management that is making the
relevant decisions.394
In comparison to the current unified-static model, a separated-
dynamic model of bargaining unit determination could significantly
facilitate the establishment of broader bargaining structures in the
case of multi-divisional corporate structures. Provisions for unit
merger under a separated-dynamic model would directly address
the problem of how to combine individual plant or divisional units
into multi-divisional company - wide bargaining structures. In addi-
tion, a provision for the use of industrial action in support of
demands for broader based bargaining structures could also provide
a dynamic route for the establishment of these structures.
389. See id. at 680 (discussing the special functions of service work and the organizational
structures most likely to succeed).
390. See id. at 678-79.
391. See JoHN PURCELL & BRUCE AmisTRAND, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMiENT IN
THE MULmI-DmsIoNAL ComPANY 139 (1994).
392. See id.
393. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159; see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate
Structure, 55 U. Ci. L. REv. 73, 78 (1988) (suggesting that attempts by unions to exert power
may be illegal under the NLRA).
394. See PURCELL & AHLSzRAND, supra note 391, at 139.
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Similarly, if under a separated-dynamic model industrial action
could be used to support demands for changes in bargaining unit
structure, it would also follow that the use of coordinated bargain-
ing techniques should not be limited in the cases where they are
being used to seek establishment of broader bargaining units.
Finally, if the significance of central corporate strategy for employ-
ment relations in the multi-divisional corporation is recognized, the
line of cases suggesting that the secondary boycott restrictions
apply to industrial action against different divisions of the same
company should be reversed.
The possible impact of allowing the merger of units to produce
broader level bargaining structures can be seen in the recent diver-
gence in trajectories of collective bargaining in the United States'
industries covered by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"),395 as com-
pared to those covered by the NLRA. Differences in the industrial
relations context in which the RLA developed, led to a substan-
tially different treatment of bargaining structure than under the
NLRA.39 6 Unlike the NLRA, the RLA was not passed to facilitate
unionization in predominantly non-unionized industries, nor to cre-
ate a new collective bargaining regime.397 When the RLA was
passed in 1926, collective bargaining had been well established on
the railways for decades.3 98  Railway workers were already
predominantly unionized. 9 The RLA was designed "to improve
collective bargaining and aid in the resolution of labor disputes."4 '
As a result, the bargaining structures under the RLA reflected this
pre-existing unionization.40 1 Rather than small, single location
units in which unions could organize for certification elections, the
RLA's bargaining structure is based on broad, employer-wide craft
units.4 °2
395. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1994 & Supp. V).
396. See Harry A. Rissetto, The National Mediation Board and the Railway Labor Act in
the 1990s, in AInIm LABOR RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ERA: Tim Naw FRONTnER 116,
116-17 (Peter Cappelli ed. 1995) (discussing the differences between the NLRA and the
RLA).
397. See id. at 117.
398. See id. at 116.
399. See id.
400. Id. at 117.
401. See Rissetto, supra note 396, at 117.
402. See Rissetto, supra note 396 at 122.
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Partly due to this structure of employer - wide units, as well as
the differences in its bargaining and impasse procedures, unions
under the RLA have been more successful in bargaining over cor-
porate level decisions than they have under the NLRA.4 °3 A key
result of the difference in bargaining structure between the two
jurisdictions is that under the NLRA, employers are unable to con-
fine union influence to individual divisions or plants of the company
and thereby avoid bargaining over issues of corporate strategy and
investment.4 °4 This produced variations in the results in the two
jurisdictions in the 1980'S.40 5 Employers governed by the NLRA
tried to avoid unionization by moving investments or jobs to differ-
ent plants, while the company-wide structure of bargaining units
under the RLA made it far more difficult.40 6 The key problem,
however, in adapting the RLA structure to the NLRA is that most
of the industries covered by the NLRA are not predominantly
unionized. 4 7 Company-wide bargaining units lose their utility for
employees if unions are unable to organize on that basis and the
employees remain without collective representation. Thus, while
providing an example of an attractive end result, the structure of
bargaining under the RLA is not appropriate for simple transfer en
bloc to the NLRA. However, a separated-dynamic process of unit
determination would at least allow the opportunity for the develop-
ment of bargaining structures under a Wagner Act model that
would provide some of the advantages of the RLA model of labor
law.
Another development relating to the impact of corporate struc-
ture on employment relations has been the increasing prominence
403. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway Labor
Act in the Era of Deregulation, 42 ST~AN. L. REv. 1485, 1487 (1990).
404. See id. at 1500-04.
405. See id. at 1526-36.
406. Peter Cappelli, Introduction to AnuLiN. LABOR RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ERA:
THE NEw FRONTIER 2-3 (Peter Cappelli ed. 1995).
Thus, moving work and jobs from unionized to non-unionized locations either by
closing the unionized facility and opening a new one or, by the mid-1980's, simply
moving jobs between existing facilities was legal under the National Labor
Relations Act and an extremely common practice in the industries it covered. This
practice is not possible in the airlines, however, because the Railway Labor Act
establishes bargaining units company wide.
Id.
407. See ARCHIBALD COx ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 92-101 (12th ed.
1996).
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of the process of corporate restructuring.4 °8 If in an era of flexibil-
ity, corporations are more likely to be changing their organizational
structures, then the question of how bargaining units are altered in
response to such changes in organization structure becomes increas-
ingly important. The existing system of unit determination allows
some scope for alteration of units by the labor relations boards in
response to the reorganization of an employer's operations.0 9
While its general approach to unit determination reflects the static
model, the NLRB has accepted that by altering its organizational
structure an employer can make existing bargaining units inappro-
priate.410 Where there has been a recent change in the employer's
organization, a U.C. petition can lead to designation of a new bar-
gaining unit structure. 411 Furthermore, an employer can make such
a reorganization without negotiating or considering the effect on
bargaining structures.412 If a bargaining unit is no longer appropri-
ate due to a business reorganization, the employer does not commit
an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the existing
unit.413 Despite its previously valid certification, the union is then
forced to apply to the NLRB for certification for a new bargaining
unit. A significant limitation of this procedure, however, is that it
has primarily been used for relatively drastic corporate changes,
such as when different plants in a multi-plant unit have been trans-
ferred to different companies.414 While this potentially gives signifi-
408. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure, 55 U. Cm. L.
R v. 73 (1988).
409. See, e.g., Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 795, 796 (1980); Pacific
Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 (1973).
410. See Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 253 N.L.R.B. at 796.
411. See id.
412. See In re Mahoning Mining Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 792, 803 (1945).
Since changing conditions in industry necessitate revision of bargaining units which
will best effectuate the policies of the Act, the Board has never held that once it has
established an appropriate unit for bargaining purposes, an employer may not in
good faith, without regard to union organization of employees, change his business
structure, sell or contract out a portion of his operations, or make any like change
which might affect the constituency of the appropriate unit without first consulting
the bargaining representative of the employees affected by the proposed business
change.
Id.
413. See Frito-Lay, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 820, 821 (1969) (holding that reorganization
eliminated the "considerable autonomy" of the bargaining unit, which was the essential
factor in the initial determination).
414. See Rock-Tenn Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 772, 773 (1985) (disregarding the bargaining
history and separating the bargaining units to conform with new corporate structure).
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cant latitude to the employer to unilaterally initiate alteration of
bargaining structures, in many instances the employer may not want
to take the risk of refusing to bargain without knowing in advance
whether the NLRB will find that the existing bargaining unit is no
longer appropriate.
Even if unit clarification procedures were to be used more widely
for internal corporate reorganizations, it is not clear that as a matter
of public policy this would be the most desirable method for dealing
with bargaining unit changes in this context. For instance, if the
changes in unit structures are ordered by the Board, it removes the
possibility of unions achieving trade-offs and concessions in return
for cooperation in the reorganization. If a unit modification is
sought at the bargaining table, the current designation of the issue
as a permissive or illegal subject of bargaining strengthens the posi-
tion of the party seeking to maintain the status quo. This creates
the possibility of especially advantageous concessions being
obtained in return for agreeing, to unit modifications.415
Under the current model, bipolar alternative outcomes are cre-
ated when companies seek to modify bargaining unit structures as
part of corporate reorganizations.416 If the company is able to con-
vince the Board that a unit alteration is necessary given the corpo-
rate reorganization, this can then be implemented without the
agreement of the union, or any accommodation being reached for
the effects of the change.417 In contrast, if the company is unable,
or anticipates it will be unable, to obtain an order from the Board
altering the unit, the union is in a very strong position at the bar-
415. Owen Darbishire has described an example of the effect of this structure of
regulation on negotiation of unit modification at the U.S. telecommunications company
Ameritech. Ameritech was seeking to implement a corporate reorganization from a
geographic organization to a business unit organization. As a result of unit modification
being a permissive subject of bargaining, Ameritech was unable to insist that the union, the
Communications Workers of America ("CWA"), renegotiate the bargaining unit structure.
The CWA was able to obtain significant concessions on wage structures and worker rights in
return for agreeing to a realignment of the bargaining structure. The system of unit
determination in this case did not prevent the restructuring of bargaining sought by
Ameritech, rather it set the terms on which the parties engaged in the negotiations. Owen R.
Darbishire, Radical versus Incremental Restructuring: Employment Relations in the
Telecommunications Industry (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hofstra Labor &
Employment Law Journal).
416. See id. (manuscript at 14).
417. See In re Mahoning Mining Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 792, 803 (1945) (stating that the Board
has never held that once an appropriate bargaining unit is established, an employer cannot
make changes without first consulting the employees' bargaining representative).
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gaining table to either block the change or extract major conces-
sions for agreeing to it.4 18 Thus, significant swings in the position of
the parties can occur depending on the Board's view of the extent
and impact of the corporate reorganization.
As an alternative, the need for alteration of unit structures in
response to a corporate reorganization could be dealt with as an
ordinary subject of negotiation between the parties.419 This could
be achieved by making it a mandatory subject of bargaining under
the NLRA,42 0 or a legal subject of bargaining in Canada.42' In par-
ticular, this would allow the use of the normal strike and lock-out
weapons in support of unit modification demands.42 Such a rule
has been proposed by some academics,42 however, it has not been
adopted in any of the Wagner Act model jurisdictions.424 If one
party were adversely affected by the alteration of the unit structure,
it would allow concessions to be extracted from the other party in
return for agreeing to the unit modification. 42 5 By testing the com-
mitment of the party seeking the unit modification through the bar-
gaining process, a more effective evaluation of the need for it could
occur. Unlike the bipolar alternatives of the current system, this
alternative could lead to a range of negotiated outcomes depending
on the parties' judgment as to the need for modification of the unit
structure. This suggests a possible additional dynamic element that
could be incorporated into the process of bargaining unit
determination.
A final issue to be noted in regard to the impact of multi-divi-
sional corporate structures is the problem of multinational corpo-
rate employers. A process of bargaining unit determination that
allows the development of broader based bargaining structures may
418. See generally Darbishire, supra note 415, (manuscript at 21) (discussing CWA's
ability to obtain concessions on wage structures and worker rights for Ameritech workers).
419. See Kenneth 0. Alexander, Conglomerate Mergers and Collective Bargaining, 24
INDUS. & LAB. RElr REv. 354, 369 (1970).
420. See id.
421. See Northwood Pulp & Timber Ltd. [1994] 23 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) 298, 314 (Can.)
(rejecting the mandatory-permissive distinction used in the United States).
422. See Alexander, supra note 419, at 371.
423. See Charles Craypo, Collective Bargaining in the Conglomerate MultiNational Firm:
Litton's Shutdown of Royal Typewriter, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REt R v. 3, 23-24 (1975).
424. See Harry C. Katz, The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining, 47 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. Rev. 3 (1993) (discussing the differences in collective bargaining in Australia, Germany,
Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
425. See Craypo, supra note 423, at 19.
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respond to the structure of multi-divisional companies if the divi-
sions are within the same jurisdiction; but what if they are located
in different countries? Corporations can exert financial control
over divisions that operate in different countries due to the interna-
tional mobility of capital.426 Foreign corporations and ownership of
financial resources are generally accorded recognition in different
national legal systems.427 However, legal bargaining structures are
generally limited to the national level.428 Even in the case of Can-
ada and the United States, where unions have been organized on a
binational basis (hence, the perhaps somewhat grandiose title
"International" in many union names), bargaining units have
remained strictly limited to their national or provincial level juris-
dictional basis.42 9 Recognition of bargaining units that span the two
countries might require some integration of labor law administra-
tion, but given the increasing economic integration within the
NAFTA region, it is a possibility that deserves further considera-
tion. While there are divergences between the Canadian and
American versions, they are at least based on the common structure
of the Wagner Act model.430 Therefore, it is possible to achieve
mutual recognition and the merger of bargaining units in the two
countries. It would be difficult to integrate Wagner Act model bar-
gaining unit structures with those in countries that have industry
level multi-employer bargaining structures. In this regard, the
European Union experiments with multinational works councils
provide an instructive example of the potential for creating mul-
tinational structures for collective representation.
C. Changing Organization of Production
The recent advent of new forms of production organization are
also introducing an element of uncertainty into the context of the
employment relationship. This altered work organization context
has the potential to significantly alter both how workers organize
426. See Craypo, supra note 423, at 19.
427. See Craypo, supra note 423, at 20-22.
428. See Craypo, supra note 423, at 23.
429. See Craypo, supra note 423, at 23.
430. Compare Northwood Pulp & Timber Ltd. [1994] 23 Can. L.R.B.R.(2d) 298 (Can.)
(distinguishing between the American "mandatory-permissive" doctrine and the "illegality"
doctrine used in Canadian jurisdictions), with NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
113 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1958) (recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling respecting the
"recognition" clause would be decided the same in Canada).
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collectively and the structures within which they bargain. With the
development of different linkages between production units in net-
works of suppliers and customers, the assumptions underlying the
existing process of bargaining unit determination are undercut. If
what occurs in the workplace is primarily determined by the pro-
duction network in which it is situated, rather than by indepen-
dently acting plant or corporate management, then a structure of
bargaining units based on independent plant units may no longer be
appropriate. At the moment, there is still much uncertainty in the
changing organization of production, with no clear single best new
system having emerged from the mixture of flexible specialization,
lean production, and other models. However, some of the issues
that may potentially arise in the context of these changes were illus-
trated in a recent case in Ontario.43'
In USWA v. Shrader Canada Ltd.,432 the USWA made a certifica-
tion application to represent employees at a plant which manufac-
tured petrochemical products for use in the automotive industry.433
A few months before the certification application, Shrader had
entered into an arrangement with one of its major customers, Ford,
to undertake the receipt, storage and distribution of chemicals for
Ford's dealers and agencies throughout Canada.434 The contract for
this operation, which Ford had formerly conducted in-house, was
handled under a separate business name, "Shrader/Malcolm,"
though no new corporation was established.435 Though located in
the same plant as the main Shrader operations, Shrader/Malcolm
operated as its own division with a separate workforce (albeit only
three employees) and separate administration.436 Despite this sepa-
ration, however, the conditions of employment and work experi-
ence of the Shrader and Shrader/Malcolm employees were similar
in other respects.437
The USWA had applied for certification of a unit consisting of all
employees at the plant, including those of Shrader/Malcolm. 438 In
response, Shrader argued that the Shrader/Malcolm employees
431. See USWA v. Shrader Canada Ltd. [1993] O.L.R.B. Rep. Mar. 246 (Can.).
432. [1993] O.L.R.B. Rep. Mar. 246 (Can.).
433. See id. at 246, 249.
434. See id. at 249-50.
435. See id. at 250.
436. See id
437. See USWA v. Shrader Canada Ltd. [1993] O.L.R.B. Rep. Mar. 246, 250 (Can.).
438. See id. at 248.
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should be in a separate unit to avoid the possibility of a strike dis-
rupting its contract with Ford.4 39 Ultimately, the board decided
that the USWA's requested unit was appropriate on the basis that
Shrader/Malcolm was not really a separate business, but rather a
special arrangement for a valued customer.44° However, the Board
held open the possibility, which the dissenting opinion would have
applied in this case, that if the new line of business was sufficiently
distinct, a separate unit would have been warranted.'44  Conse-
quently, neither the majority nor the dissent in this case addressed
the employer's main argument, which was not the distinctiveness of
the line of the business, but rather the effect of the new business
being integrated into Ford's production network.' 4 This context
could have an impact on both organizing and bargaining.
Concerning organizing, it is possible to imagine divergent con-
cerns and hence different degrees of interest in collective organiza-
tion emerging between employees in the same plant who are in
departments or divisions tied into different production networks." 3
Varying employee attitudes may emerge with experiences in differ-
ent systems of work organization. Suppose in the Shrader case that
the Shrader employees were not interested in organizing, but that
the Shrader/Malcolm employees had a series of grievances arising
from the impact of shipping time pressures put on the business by
Ford. In that situation, it would seem appropriate to allow the
Shrader/Malcolm employees to organize collectively as a unit even
if the Shrader employees did not wish to be represented.
Different considerations could arise in the bargaining context.
Suppose both the Shrader and Shrader/Malcolm employees were
organized. It is possible that the two groups would share common
concerns about working conditions established by the management
of Shrader, in which case, bargaining together would make sense.
On the other hand, the primary concerns of the Shbader/Malcolm
employees might arise from the effect of policies established by
Ford. In that case, their common bargaining interests might not lie
439. See id. at 251.
440. See id. at 252.
441. See id. at 252-54.
442. See USWA v. Shrader Canada Ltd. [1993] O.L.R.B. Rep. Mar. 246, 251 (Can.).
443. See USWA, The Steelworkers and Work Reorganization (Feb. 21, 1994)
(unpublished summary report of TARP 1 case studies, on file with the Hofstra Labor &
Employment Law Journal).
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with those of the Shrader employees, but with the employees of
Ford.
While these possibilities are only speculative in this particular
case, they raise the problem of how to deal with issues of organiza-
tion and bargaining in a context of alternative systems of work
organization and networks of production.4 " What groupings of
common interests will lead workers to organize collectively?
Where will common concerns lie in bargaining? Suppose a labor
relations board was considering an application for a unit consisting
of employees of both assembly and parts supplier plants in different
firms, but the same production network. The board would have to
make judgments about the relationship between the firms and the
production network. It is not clear whether there is a simple or
single correct answer in such cases. One of the dominant character-
istics in the development of alternative work systems is the degree
of variation in systems that has occurred. It is not clear whether
there is an ideal practice for work organization.
As in the case of corporate restructuring, a separated-dynamic
model may be more appropriate for responding to this environment
of uncertainty and shifting organizational and production sys-
tems." 5 Allowing normal bargaining over unit structures could pro-
vide an economic crucible to test the necessity of unit
reorganization in light of changes in the organization of produc-
tion." 6 Additionally, under a separated-dynamic model, Boards
could combine petitions for merger or modification of units with
self-determination elections to allow employees greater opportunity
for expression of their interests." 7 They may lie with the legal
entity of the employer firm, with workers in the same workplace, or
with other workers in the same production network.448
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
With shifts in the industrial relations environment, structures of
labor law regulation need to be re-evaluated for their continued
appropriateness. In this regard, despite its centrality to labor law,
bargaining unit determination is a process that has received rela-
444. See supra text accompanying notes 90-118.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101, 114-18.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 107-18.
447. See Shrader Canada Ltd. O.L.R.B. Rep. Mar. at 252.
448. See id.
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tively little attention. To some degree, the emphasis on the case by
case treatment of unit determinations may obscure the underlying
theoretical structure of the process. Breaking down the concept of
the bargaining unit as a legal entity and viewing the unit as a nexus
of rules governing different aspects of the labor relationship, pro-
vides a point of critique that helps clarify this structure.44 9 In par-
ticular, the nexus of rules of conceptualization emphasize the
different roles of the bargaining unit in the constitutive and power
broker facets of labor law. As part of the constitutive facet, the
bargaining unit serves as the electoral district for determining rep-
resentation.450 As part of the power broker facet, the bargaining
unit serves as the unit to which legal rights and obligations relating
to bargaining adhere.451 Viewing the bargaining unit as a reified
legal entity, it may appear natural to collapse these two aspects of
regulation into a single unit entity. The advantage of the nexus of
rules conceptualization is that it suggests alternative models of unit
determination as plausible policy options.
Two particular alternative models have been developed that
describe different approaches to the relationship between the major
regulatory facets of unit determination. One model would unify the
electoral district and bargaining unit aspects in a single unit that
remains static in normal circumstances.452 This unified-static model
is embodied in the predominant current process of bargaining unit
determination.4 53 This process has produced an emphasis on rela-
tively narrow legal bargaining units that are constructed based on
considerations relating to the functions of personnel administration
and low level operational management. Collective representation
is initially established at this level and then becomes limited to it,
due to the unwillingness of labor relations boards under this model
to merge units.4 54 Voluntary merger of units, held out by boards as
the appropriate mode for unit expansion, may have been effective
during the period of labor-management agreement on broad-based
bargaining structures in the post-war industrial relations system.
However, with the breakdown of that system it has become a false
449. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
450. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
451. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 205-229.
453. See supra text accompanying notes 212-214.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 212-214.
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promise. Instead, the restrictions on use of the normal weapons of
industrial conflict in support of bargaining unit alteration and the
restriction of those weapons to the realm of existing bargaining
units have limited the ability to utilize bargaining power in aid of
the establishment or preservation of broader based structures.
These elements reinforce the bias towards narrow legal bargaining
units under the current unified-static process of unit determination
and thus limit the scope and effectiveness of collective representa-
tion under the Wagner Act model.455
The second alternative model would involve separate evaluation
of the initial representation and bargaining regulation aspects of the
unit determination process. Such a model would allow for this sep-
aration by making the concept of the unit dynamic, being modified
over time as the nature of the bargaining relationship changes.
While a fully separated-dynamic model of unit determination does
not exist at present in any jurisdiction, elements of it can be seen in
some departures that have occurred from the predominant unified-
static model.456 Both labor relations boards and legislative initia-
tives have experimented with introducing dynamic elements to the
process of unit determination by providing for merger of existing
bargaining units.4 57 In an even more significant change, the British
Columbia Labour Relations Board has developed a process for tra-
ditionally hard to organize industries that contains both separated
and dynamic elements.458 Under this approach, the focus in the ini-
tial representation application is on creating a unit with coherent
and defensible boundaries for initially establishing collective bar-
gaining.459 In particular, there is a recognition that the Board is not
necessarily creating a permanent bargaining structure for the firm.
The dynamic element is emphasized by the explicit provision that
this unit will be modified as collective organization becomes better
455. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90
Yale LJ. 1509, 1511 (1981).
456. See generally Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 29, 30 (1973) (affirming the
Board's finding "that the single-plant unit and multiplant units constituted equally
appropriate units for bargaining"); Woodward Stores (Vancouver) Ltd. [1974] 1 Can.
L.R.B.R. 114, 119 (determining that collective bargaining is appropriate for those small
pockets of employees who want it).
457. See Woodward Stores 1 Can. L.R.B.R. at 120.
458. See id. at 118 (quoting Insurance Corp. of B.C. [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 403, 407
(Can.)).
459. See id. at 119.
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established and the bargaining relationship develops.4 60 A more
general separated-dynamic model of unit determination could have
as its initial foundation, the Woodward Stores approach as a basic
process available in all types of representation cases, not limited to
traditionally hard to organize industries. This could be combined
with unit merger provisions allowing the development of larger
units, calling for effective bargaining power for units in such con-
texts as multi-divisional companies. An additional element in an
alternative separated-dynamic model could be the elimination of
restrictions on bargaining over unit determination questions. This
can be accomplished by making it a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing under the NLRA, or by making it a legal subject of bargaining
in Canada. The elements of a separated-dynamic element that have
been outlined are all within the realm of available labor relations
board decision making under present legislation, derived from the
Wagner Act model. This is a particularly important consideration
in the United States given the political difficulties attendant upon
any attempts to amend the NLRA.46'
The significance of adopting such an alternative separated-
dynamic model can be seen in its potential role in response to a
series of shifts that have occurred in the industrial relations envi-
ronment in recent years. A separated-dynamic model could facili-
tate collective organization in the service sector and in the context
of new alternative work systems, two areas that depart from the
traditional industrial context in which the existing process of bar-
gaining unit determination was developed. Allowing organization
on the basis of the scattered workplaces of the service sector, and
then merger of units to create negotiating units with effective bar-
gaining power could increase the relevance of the Wagner Act
model of unionism in the service sector. In the context of alterna-
tive systems of production, a separated-dynamic model could pro-
vide a structure for organization appropriate to the diversity of
460. See id. at 120.
461. See 136 CONG. REc. E3422-02, E3425 (Oct. 24, 1990) (discussing a letter from
Elizabeth Dole expressing the Bush Administration's strong opposition to, and impending
veto of this 1990 amendment to the NLRA reforming provisions relating to child labor.
"[E]nactment of this legislation would not be in accord with the program of the President.");
see also 142 CONG. Rac. H8816-01 (July 30, 1996) (outlining a veto message from President
Clinton relating to the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, which would
amend the NLRA to allow labor management cooperative efforts that improve economic
competitiveness in the United States to continue to thrive).
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worker interests created by these production systems. Another pol-
icy effect of a separated-dynamic system in the context of multi-
divisional companies would be to permit merger of units, allowing
the development of broader based bargaining units with greater
ability to bargain effectively at a strategic level. In the area of cor-
porate reorganization, allowing a dynamic process of bargaining
over unit structures could permit more effective evaluation of the
need for bargaining unit alteration in response to corporate reor-
ganization and a negotiated implementation of such unit alteration.
Finally, a separated-dynamic model could facilitate adaptation of
labor law to emerging structures of economic organization, such as
the linking of firms into production networks. While the models of
unit determination developed here do not provide a complete
response in any of these areas, this analysis indicates the impor-
tance of unit determination questions in dealing with these issues.
Rethinking the process of bargaining unit determination and the
underlying theoretical structure embodied in it may provide addi-
tional insights in developing public policy responses for the chang-
ing workplace.
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